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Abstract. A recent line of works – initiated by Gordon, Katz and
Vaikuntanathan (Asiacrypt 2010) – gave lattice-based realizations of
privacy-preserving protocols allowing users to authenticate while remain-
ing hidden in a crowd. Despite five years of efforts, known constructions
remain limited to static populations of users, which cannot be dynamically
updated. For example, none of the existing lattice-based group signatures
seems easily extendable to the more realistic setting of dynamic groups.
This work provides new tools enabling the design of anonymous authen-
tication systems whereby new users can register and obtain credentials
at any time. Our first contribution is a signature scheme with efficient
protocols, which allows users to obtain a signature on a committed value
and subsequently prove knowledge of a signature on a committed message.
This construction, which builds on the lattice-based signature of Bo¨hl et
al. (Eurocrypt’13), is well-suited to the design of anonymous credentials
and dynamic group signatures. As a second technical contribution, we
provide a simple, round-optimal joining mechanism for introducing new
members in a group. This mechanism consists of zero-knowledge argu-
ments allowing registered group members to prove knowledge of a secret
short vector of which the corresponding public syndrome was certified by
the group manager. This method provides similar advantages to those of
structure-preserving signatures in the realm of bilinear groups. Namely, it
allows group members to generate their public key on their own without
having to prove knowledge of the underlying secret key. This results in a
two-round join protocol supporting concurrent enrollments, which can be
used in other settings such as group encryption.
Keywords. Lattice-based cryptography, anonymity, signatures with effi-
cient protocols, dynamic group signatures, anonymous credentials.
1 Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography is currently emerging as a promising alternative
to traditional public-key techniques. During the last decade, it has received a
permanent interest (see [70] and references therein) due to its numerous ad-
vantages. Not only does it seemingly resist quantum attacks, it also provides
a better asymptotic efficiency than its relatives based on conventional number
theory. While enabling advanced functionalities (like fully homomorphic [44]
or attribute-based/predicate encryption [47,48] for circuits) that remain elusive
outside the lattice world, lattice-based primitives tend to interact with zero-
knowledge proofs [46] less smoothly than their counterparts in abelian groups
endowed with a bilinear map (see, e.g., [18,32,42,52,2]) or groups of hidden order
[6,30,31,27]. Arguably, this partially arises from the fact that lattices have far less
algebraic structure than, e.g., pairing-friendly cyclic groups. It is not surprising
that the most efficient zero-knowledge proofs for lattice-related languages [15]
take advantage of the extra algebraic structure available in the ring setting [65]. A
consequence of the scarcity of truly efficient zero-knowledge proofs in the lattice
setting is that, in the context of anonymity and privacy-preserving protocols,
lattice-based cryptography has undergone significantly slower development than
in other areas like functional encryption [47,48]. While natural realizations of
ring signatures [72] showed up promptly [54,22] after the seminal work of Gentry,
Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) [45], viable constructions of lattice-based
group signatures [49] remained lacking until the work of Gordon, Katz and
Vaikuntanathan [49] in 2010. Despite recent advances in the area [59,14,67,63],
lattice-based group signatures and other privacy-preserving primitives remain
substantially less practical and powerful in terms of functionalities than their
siblings based on traditional number theoretic problems [6,18,42,57] for which
solutions even exist [20,21,51,10] outside the random oracle methodology. For
example, we still have no convenient realization of group signature supporting
dynamic groups [13,57] or anonymous credentials [37,29].
In this paper, we address the latter two problems by first proposing a lattice-
based signature with efficient protocols in the fashion of Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [31]. To ease its use in the design of dynamic group signatures, we design
a zero-knowledge argument system that allows a user to prove knowledge of a
signature on a public key for which the user knows the underlying secret key.
Related Work. Anonymous credentials were first suggested by Chaum [37]
and efficiently realized by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [29,31]. They involve
one or more credential issuer(s) and a set of users who have a long-term secret
key which constitutes a their digital identity and pseudonyms that can be seen
as commitments to their secret key. Users can dynamically obtain credentials
from an issuer that only knows users’ pseudonyms and obliviously certifies users’
secret keys as well as (optionally) a set of attributes. Later on, users can make
themselves known to verifiers under a different pseudonym and demonstrate
possession of the issuer’s signature on their secret key without revealing neither
the signature or the key. Anonymous credentials typically consist of a protocol
whereby the user obtains the issuer’s signature on a committed message, another
protocol for proving that two commitments open to the same value (which allows
proving that the same secret underlies two distinct pseudonyms) and a protocol
for proving possession of a secret message-signature pair.
The first efficient constructions were given by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
under the Strong RSA assumption [29,31] or using bilinear groups [32]. Other
2
solutions were subsequently given with additional useful properties such as non-
interactivity [10], delegatability [9], a better efficiency in the private key setting
[36], or support for efficient attributes [25] (see [28] and references therein).
Anonymous credentials with attributes are often obtained by having the issuer
obliviously sign a multi-block message (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN ), where one block is the
secret key while other blocks contain public or private attributes. Note that,
for the sake of keeping the scheme compatible with zero-knowledge proofs, the
blocks (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN ) cannot be simply hashed before getting signed using a
ordinary, single-block signature.
Group signatures are a central anonymity primitive, introduced by Chaum
and van Heyst [38] in 1991, which allows members of a group managed by some
authority to sign messages in the name of the entire group. At the same time,
users remain accountable for the messages they sign since an opening authority
can identify them if they misbehave.
Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye and Tsudik [6] provided the first scalable con-
struction meeting the security requirements that can be intuitively expected
from the primitive, although clean security notions were not available yet at
that time. Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [11] filled this gap by providing
suitable security notions for static groups, which were subsequently extended
to the dynamic setting3 by Kiayias and Yung [57] and Bellare, Shi and Zhang
[13]. In these models, efficient schemes have been put forth in the random oracle
model [57,42] (the ROM) and in the standard model [51,2,1]
Lattice-based group signatures were put forth for the first time by Gordon,
Katz and Vaikuntanathan [49] whose solution had linear-size signatures in the
number of group members. Camenisch, Neven and Ru¨ckert [33] extended [49] so
as to achieve anonymity in the strongest sense. Laguillaumie et al. [58] decreased
the signature length to be logarithmic in the number Ngs of group members.
While asymptotically shorter, their signatures remained space-consuming as,
analogously to the Boyen-Waters group signature [20], their scheme encrypts
each bit of the signer’s identity individually. Simpler and more efficient solutions
with O(logN) signature size were given by Nguyen, Zhang and Zhang [67] and
Ling, Nguyen and Wang [63]. In particular, the latter scheme [63] achieves signif-
icantly smaller signatures by encrypting all bits of the signer’s identity at once.
Benhamouda et al. [14] described a hybrid group signature that simultaneously
relies on lattice assumptions (in the ring setting) and discrete-logarithm-related
assumptions. Recently, Libert, Ling, Nguyen and Wang [61] obtained substantial
efficiency improvements via a construction based on Merkle trees which eliminates
the need for GPV trapdoors [45]. For the time being, all known group signatures
are designed for static groups and analyzed in the model of Bellare, Micciancio
and Warinschi [11], where no new group member can be introduced after the
setup phase. To date, it remains an open problem to design a lattice-based system
that supports dynamically growing population of users in the models of [13,57].
3 By “dynamic setting”, we refer to a scenario where new group members can register
at any time but, analogously to [13,57], we do not consider the orthogonal problem
of user recovation here.
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Our Contributions. Our first result is a lattice-based signature with efficient
protocols for multi-block messages. Namely, we provide a way for a user to obtain
a signature on a committed N -block message (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN ) as well as a
protocol for proving possession of a valid message-signature pair. The signature
and its companion protocols can serve as a building block for constructing
lattice-based anonymous credentials and can potentially find other applications
in the design of compact e-cash systems [26] under lattice assumptions. The main
application that we consider in this paper is the construction of a lattice-based
group signature scheme for dynamic groups. While less efficient than the recent
proposal of [61], our scheme is competitive with the solution of Ling, Nguyen
and Wang [63] which is one of the most efficient candidates based on standard
(i.e., non-ideal) lattices in static groups. In particular, it features O(logNgs)-size
signatures for groups of up to Ngs members and only lengthens the signatures
of [63] by a (small) constant factor. We prove the security of our system in the
random oracle model [12] under the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning-
With-Errors (LWE) assumptions.
To simplify the use of our signature scheme in the design of our dynamic group
signatures, we also develop a zero-knowledge argument system allowing a group
member to prove knowledge of a secret key (consisting of a short Gaussian vector)
and a membership certificate issued by the group manager on the corresponding
public key. This method can be seen as a lattice-based analogue of structure-
preserving signatures in that it allows a signer to sign public keys without hashing
them while remaining oblivious of the underlying secret key. Our zero-knowledge
argument system and the signature scheme allow us to construct a dynamic
joining protocol – which allows the group manager to dynamically introduce
new group members by issuing a membership certificate on their public key –
which does not require any proof of knowledge on behalf of the prospective user.
As a result, the joining protocol is round-optimal: only one message is sent in
each direction when the new user interacts with the group manager.4 Besides
being the first lattice-based group signatures for dynamic groups, our scheme
thus remains secure in the setting advocated by Kiayias and Yung [56], where
many users want to join at the same time and concurrently interact with the
group manager. We believe that, analogously to structure-preserving signatures
[2,1], the combination of our signature scheme and zero-knowledge arguments
can serve as a building blocks for other primitives, including group encryption
[55,35] or adaptive oblivious transfer [50].
Our Techniques. Our signature scheme with efficient protocols builds on the
SIS-based signature of Bo¨hl et al. [16], which is itself a variant of Boyen’s signa-
ture [19]. Recall that the latter scheme involves a public key containing matrices
A,A0, . . . ,A` ∈ Zn×mq and signs an `-bit message Msg ∈ {0, 1}` by computing a
short vector v ∈ Z2m such that [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1 Msg[i]Aj ] · v = 0m mod q. The
variant of Bo¨hl et al. [16] only uses a constant number of matrices A,A0,A1 ∈
4 Note that each signature still requires the user to prove knowledge of his secret key.
However, this is not a problem in concurrent settings as the proof of knowledge is
made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
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Zn×mq . Each signature is associated with a single-use tag tag (which is only used
in one signing query in the proof) and the public key involves an extra matrix
D ∈ Zn×mq and a vector u ∈ Znq . An message Msg is signed by first applying
a chameleon hash function h = CMHash(Msg, s) ∈ {0, 1}m and signing h by
computing a short v ∈ Zm such that [A | A0 + tag ·A1] · v = u + D · h mod q.
Our scheme extends the latter scheme – modulo the use of a larger number of
matrices {Aj}`j=0 as in Boyen’s scheme – so that a signature on N -block message
(Msg1, . . . ,MsgN ) ∈ ({0, 1})N consists of a tag τ ∈ {0, 1}` and a short vector
v ∈ Z2m such that [A | A0+
∑`
j=1 τ [j]·Aj ]·v = u+CMHash(Msg1, . . . ,MsgN , s),
where the chamelon hash function computes cM = D0 · s+
∑N
k=1 Dk ·Msgk ∈ Znq ,
for some integer vector s, before re-encoding cM ∈ Znq into {0, 1}m.
In order to obtain a signature scheme akin to the one of Camenisch-Lysyanksaya
[31], our idea is to have the tag τ ∈ {0, 1}` play the same role as the prime
exponent in Strong-RSA-based schemes [31]. In the security proof of [16], we
are faced with two situations: either the adversary produces a signature on a
fresh tag τ?, or it recycles a tag τ (i) used by the signing oracle for a new, un-
signed message (Msg?1, . . . ,Msg
?
N ). In the former case, the proof can proceed as
in Boyen’s proof [19]. In the latter case, the reduction must guess upfront which
tag τ (i
†) the adversary will choose to re-use and find a way to properly answer
the i†-th signing query without using the vanished trapdoor (for other queries,
the Agrawal et al. technique [3] applies to compute a suitable v using a trapdoor
hidden in {Aj}`j=0). Bo¨hl et al. [16] solve this problem by “programming” the
vector u ∈ Znq in a special way and achieve full security using chameleon hashing.
To adapt this idea in the context of signatures with efficient protocols, we
have to overcome two difficulties. The first one is to map cM ∈ Znq back in the
domain of the chameleon hash function while preserving the compatiblity with
zero-knowledge proofs. To solve this problem, we extend a technique used in [61]
in order to build a “zero-knowledge-friendly” chameleon hash function. This func-
tion hashes a vector (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN ) by choosing m = ndlog qe and outputting
h = bin(D0 ·s+
∑N
k=1 Dk ·Msgk) ∈ {0, 1}m where, for any vector v ∈ Znq , bin(v) ∈
{0, 1}m denotes the vector obtained by replacing each coordinate of v by its binary
decomposition. If we define the matrix H =
[
1 | 2 | . . . | 2dlog qe]⊗In, we can prove
that h = CMHash(Msg1, . . . ,MsgN , s,w) by demonstrating knowledge of short
vectors (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN , s,h) such that H ·w = D0 · s +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·Msgk, which
boils down to arguing knowledge of a solution to the ISIS problem [62]. Then, we
extend the techniques of [63] to prove knowledge of (τ,v, s) and (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN )
satisfying [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ [j]·Aj ]·v = u+CMHash(Msg1, . . . ,MsgN , s), without
revealing any of the witnesses. In a nutshell, we show that most of the involved
statements are equivalent to asserting that a short integer vector x satisfies an
equation of the form P · x = v mod q, for some public matrix P and vector v,
and belongs to a set VALID of short vectors with a particular structure. While
the small-norm property of x is provable using standard techniques (e.g., [64]),
we prove its membership of VALID by leveraging the combinatorial properties of
Stern-like protocols [62] and playing with their underlying permutations.
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The second problem arises when, analogously to [31], we extend the scheme
into a protocol for signing committed messages. In this case, the signer must first
additively re-randomize the user’s commitment cU = D0 · s +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·Msgk
before generating a signature on the hidden messages. This is indeed neccessary
to provide the reduction with a backdoor allowing to correctly answer the i†-
th signing query by “programming” the randomness s of the chameleon hash.
One difficulty is that the randomness of the commitment (like the one of the
chameleon hash function) is a discrete Gaussian vector which, unlike vectors of
finite field elements, cannot easily be programmed in a statistically indistinguish-
able manner: this technique indeed affects the standard deviation of the Gaussian
vector s in exactly one signing query. Using integer commitments, Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [31] address a similar problem by letting the signer’s randomness
be exponentially larger than the initial randomness of the user’s commitment:
this allows the distribution of the “programmed” randomness to be statistically
close to that of the sum of the two contributions of the signer and the user in
the real scheme. While a similar technique, called “smudging”, has been used
in the lattice setting by Asharov et al. [5, Lemma 2.1], it requires the modulus
q to be exponentially large as well. Here, we adopt a more efficient solution,
inspired by the results of Bai et al. [7], which is to apply an analysis based on the
Re´nyi divergence rather than the statistical distance. In short, the probability
preservation property of the Re´nyi divergence tells us that, if some event E occurs
with noticeable probability in some probability space P , so does it in a different
probability space Q for which the second order Re´nyi divergence R2(P ||Q) is
sufficiently small. In our setting, R2(P ||Q) is precisely polynomially bounded
since the two probability spaces only diverge in one signing query.
Our dynamic group signature scheme avoids these difficulties because the
group manager does not have to obliviously sign messages: instead of signing the
user’s secret key as usually done in anonymous credentials, the group manager
creates a membership certificate consistig of a signature on the user’s public key.
Our zero-knowledge argument system accommodates the requirements of our
group signature in the following way. In the joining protocol that dynamically in-
troduces new group members, the prospective user i chooses a membership secret
consisting of a short discrete Gaussian vector zi ∈ Zm. This user generates a pub-
lic syndrome vi = F · zi mod q, for some public matrix F, which constitutes his
public key. In order to certify vi ∈ Znq , the group manager computes a coordinate-
wise binary expansion of vi so as to obtain a vector bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}ndlog qe. The
latter vector is then signed using our variant of the Bo¨hl et al. signature. Using the
resulting signature (τ,v, s) as a membership certificate, the group member will be
able to sign a message by proving that: (i) He holds a valid signature (τ,v, s) on
some secret binary message bin(vi); (ii) The latter vector bin(vi) is the binary ex-
pansion of some syndrome vi ∈ Zq of which he knows a GPV pre-image zi ∈ Zm.
We remark that condition (ii) can be proved by providing evidence that, if we
define H = In ⊗ [1 | 2 | . . . | 2dlog qe], we have vi = H · bin(vi) = F · zi mod q,
for some short vector zi ∈ Zm and some binary bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}ndlog qe. As was
previously noticed in [63], the framework of Stern-like protocols [74] and its
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extensions to lattices [54,62] is well-suited to efficiently argue such statements,
especially for conditions of the form bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}ndlog qe. The fact that the
underlying chameleon hash function smoothly interacts with Stern-like zero-
knowledge proofs is the poperty that maintains the user’s capability of efficiently
proving knowledge of the underlying secret key.
Organization. In the forthcoming sections, we first provide some background
in Section 2. Our lattice-based signature with efficient protocols is presented in
Section 3, where we also give protocols for obtaining a signature on a committed
message and proving knowledge of a signature on a committed message. Section 4
uses our signature scheme in the design of dynamic group signatures. In Section 5,
we finally provide the details of the zero-knowledge arguments for the statements
to be proved in our protocols of Section 3 and 4.
2 Background and Definitions
In the following, all vectors are denoted in bold lower-case letters, whereas bold
upper-case letters will be used for matrices. If b ∈ Rn, its euclidean norm will
be denoted by ‖b‖. This notation is extended to matrices B ∈ Rm×n with
columns (bi)i≤n by ‖B‖ = maxi≤n ‖bi‖. If B is full column-rank, we let B˜
denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of B.
When S is a finite set, we denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S
and by x←↩ U(S) the action of sampling x according to this distribution.
2.1 Lattices
A (full-rank) lattice L is the set of all integer linear combinations of some linearly
independent basis vectors (bi)i≤n belonging to some Rn. We work with q-ary
lattices, for some prime q.
Definition 1. Let m ≥ n ≥ 1, a prime q ≥ 2 and A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq , define
Λq(A) := {e ∈ Zm | ∃s ∈ Znq s.t. AT · s = e mod q} as well as
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = 0n mod q}, Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = u mod q}
For any t ∈ Λuq (A), Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + t so that Λuq (A) is a shift of Λ⊥q (A).
For a lattice L, a vector c ∈ Rn and a real σ > 0, define ρσ,c(x) = exp(−pi‖x−
c‖2/σ2). The discrete Gaussian distribution of support L, parameter σ and center
c is defined as DL,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)/ρσ,c(L) for any y ∈ L. We denote by DL,σ(y)
the distribution centered in c = 0. We will extensively use the fact that samples
from DL,σ are short with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 1 ([8, Le. 1.5]). For any lattice L ⊆ Rn and positive real number σ > 0,
we have Prb←↩DL,σ [‖b‖ ≤
√
nσ] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(n).
As shown by Gentry et al. [45], Gaussian distributions with lattice support
can be sampled from efficiently, given a sufficiently short basis of the lattice.
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Lemma 2 ([23, Le. 2.3]). There exists a PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time)
algorithm GPVSample that takes as inputs a basis B of a lattice L ⊆ Zn and a
rational σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ ·Ω(√log n), and outputs vectors b ∈ L with distribution DL,σ.
Lemma 3 ([4, Th. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm TrapGen that takes
as inputs 1n, 1m and an integer q ≥ 2 with m ≥ Ω(n log q), and outputs a
matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) such that A is within statistical
distance 2−Ω(n) to U(Zn×mq ), and ‖T˜A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q).
Lemma 3 is often combined with the sampler from Lemma 2. Micciancio and
Peikert [66] recently proposed a more efficient approach for this combined task,
which should be preferred in practice but, for the sake of simplicity, we present
our schemes using TrapGen.
We also make use of an algorithm that extends a trapdoor for A ∈ Zn×mq to
a trapdoor of any B ∈ Zn×m′q whose left n×m submatrix is A.
Lemma 4 ([34, Le. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm ExtBasis that takes
as inputs a matrix B ∈ Zn×m′q whose first m columns span Znq , and a basis TA
of Λ⊥q (A) where A is the left n ×m submatrix of B, and outputs a basis TB
of Λ⊥q (B) with ‖T˜B‖ ≤ ‖T˜A‖.
In our security proofs, analogously to [19,16] we also use a technique due
to Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen [3] that implements an all-but-one trapdoor
mechanism (akin to the one of Boneh and Boyen [17]) in the lattice setting.
Lemma 5 ([3, Th. 19]). There exist a PPT algorithm SampleRight that takes
as input matrices A,C ∈ Zn×mq , a low-norm matrix R ∈ Zm×m, a short basis
TC ∈ Zm×m of Λ⊥q (C), a vector u ∈ Znq and a rational σ such that σ ≥ ‖T˜C‖ ·
Ω(
√
log n), and outputs vectors b ∈ Z2m such that [A A ·R + C ]·b = u mod q
and with distribution statistically close to DL,σ where L denotes the shifted lattice
{x ∈ Z2m : [A A ·R + C ] · x = u mod q}.
2.2 Computational Problems
The security of our schemes provably relies (in the ROM) on the assumption that
both algorithmic problems below are hard, i.e., cannot be solved in polynomial
time with non-negligible probability and non-negligible advantage, respectively.
Definition 2. Let m, q, β be functions of a parameter n. The Short Integer
Solution problem SISm,q,β is as follows: Given A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), find x ∈ Λ⊥q (A)
with 0 < ‖x‖ ≤ β.
Definition 3. Let q, α be functions of a parameter n. For s ∈ Znq (a secret),
the distribution Aq,α,s over Znq × Zq is obtained by sampling a ←↩ U(Znq ) and
(a noise) e ←↩ DZ,αq, and returning (a, 〈a, s〉 + e). The Learning With Errors
problem LWEq,α is as follows: For s ←↩ U(Znq ), distinguish between arbitrarily
many independent samples from U(Znq ×Zq) and the same number of independent
samples from Aq,α,s.
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If q ≥ √nβ and m,β ≤ poly(n), then standard worst-case lattice problems
with approximation factors γ = O˜(β√n) reduce to SISm,q,β (see, e.g., [45, Se. 9]).
Similarly, if αq = Ω(
√
n), standard worst-case lattice problems with approxima-
tion factors γ = O(α/n) quantumly reduce [71,69,23] to LWEq,α.
3 A Lattice-Based Signature with Efficient Protocols
Our scheme can be seen as a variant of the Bo¨hl et al. signature [16], where each
signature is a triple (τ,v, s), made of a tag τ ∈ {0, 1}` and integer vectors (v, s)
satisfying [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ [j] ·Aj ] · v = u + D · h mod q, where A,D ∈ Zn×mq
are public random matrices and h ∈ {0, 1}m is a chameleon hash of the message
which is computed using randomness s. A difference is that, while [16] uses a
short single-use tag τ ∈ Zq, we need the tag to be an `-bit string τ ∈ {0, 1}`
which will assume the same role as the prime exponent of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
signatures [31] in the security proof.
We show that a suitable chameleon hash function makes the scheme compatible
with Stern-like zero-knowledge arguments [62,63] for arguing possession of a valid
message-signature pair. Section 5 shows how to translate such a statement into
asserting that a short witness vector x with a particular structure satisfies a
relation of the form P · x = v mod q, for some public matrix P and vector
v. The underlying chameleon hash can be seen as a composition of the SIS-
based chameleon hash of [34, Section 4.1] with a technique used in [68,61]:
on input of a message (m1, . . . ,mN , s), it outputs the binary decomposition of
D0 · s +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·mk mod q, for some discrete Gaussian vector s.
3.1 Description
We assume that messages are vectors of N blocks Msg = (m1, . . . ,mN ), where each
block is an 2m-bit string mk = mk[1] . . .mk[2m] ∈ {0, 1}2m for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
For each vector v ∈ ZLq , we denote by bin(v) ∈ {0, 1}Ldlog qe the vector
obtained by replacing each coordinate of v by its binary representation.
Keygen(1λ, 1N ): Given a security parameter λ > 0 and the number of blocks
N = poly(λ), choose the following parameters: n = O(λ); a sufficiently large
modulus q = poly(n); dimension m = 2ndlog qe; an integer ` = Θ(λ); and
Gaussian parameters σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n), σ0 = 2
√
2(N + 1)σm3/2, and
σ1 =
√
σ20 + σ
2. Define the message space as ({0, 1}2m)N .
1. Run TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) to get A ∈ Zn×mq and a short basis TA of Λ⊥q (A).
This basis allows computing short vectors in Λ⊥q (A) with a Gaussian
parameter σ. Next, choose `+ 1 random A0,A1, . . . ,A` ←↩ U(Zn×mq ).
2. Choose random matrices D←↩ U(Zn×mq ), D0,D1, . . . ,DN ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq )
as well as a random vector u←↩ U(Znq ).
The private key consists of SK := TA and the public key is
PK :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, {Dk}Nk=0, D, u
)
.
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Sign
(
SK,Msg)
)
: To sign anN -block message Msg = (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈
({0, 1}2m)N ,
1. Choose a random binary string τ ←↩ U({0, 1}`). Then, using SK := TA,
compute a short delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m for the matrix
Aτ = [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1
τ [j]Aj ] ∈ Zn×2mq . (1)
2. Choose a discrete Gaussian vector s ←↩ DZ2m,σ1 . Compute the vector
cM ∈ Z2nq as a chamelon hash of (m1, . . . ,mN ). Namely, compute
cM = D0 · s +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk ∈ Z2nq ,
which is used to define uM = u + D · bin(cM ) ∈ Znq . Then, using the dele-
gated basis Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m, sample a short vector v ∈ Z2m in DΛuMq (Aτ ),σ.
Output the signature sig = (τ,v, s) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Zm.
Verify
(
PK,Msg, sig
)
: Given PK, a message Msg = (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈ ({0, 1}m)N
and a purported signature sig = (τ,v, s) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Z2m, return 1 if
Aτ · v = u + D · bin(D0 · s +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk) mod q. (2)
and ‖v‖ < σ√2m, ‖s‖ < σ1
√
2m.
When the scheme is used for obliviously signing committed messages, the security
proof follows Bai et al. [7] in that it applies an argument based on the Re´nyi
divergence in one signing query. This argument requires to sample s from a
Gaussian distribution whose standard deviation σ1 is polynomially larger than σ.
We note that, instead of being included in the public key, the matrices
{Dk}Nk=0 can be part of common public parameters shared by many signers.
Indeed, only the matrices (A, {Ai}`i=0) should be specific to the user who holds
the secret key SK = TA. In Section 3.3, we use a variant where {Dk}Nk=0 belong
to public parameters.
3.2 Security Analysis
The security analysis in Theorem 1 requires that q > `.
Theorem 1. The scheme is secure under chosen-message attacks under the SIS
assumption.
Proof. The prove the result, we will distinguish two kinds of attacks:
Type I attacks are attacks where, in the adversary’s forgery sig? = (τ?,v?, s?),
τ? did not appear in any output of the signing oracle.
10
Type II attacks are such that, in the adversary’s forgery sig? = (τ?,v?, s?),
τ? is recycled from an output sig(i
?) = (τ (i
?),v(i
?), s(i
?)) of the signing
oracle, for some index i? ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. However, if Msg? = (m?1, . . . ,m?N ) and
Msg(i
?) = (m
(i?)
1 , . . . ,m
(i?)
N ) denote the forgery message and the i
?-th signing
query, respectively, we have D0·s?+
∑N
k=1 Dk·m?k 6= D0·s(i
?)+
∑N
k=1 Dk·m(i
?)
k .
Type III attacks are those where the adversary’s forgery sig? = (τ?,v?, s?)
recycles τ? from an output sig(i
?) = (τ (i
?),v(i
?), s(i
?)) of the signing oracle
(i.e., τ (i
?) = τ? for some index i? ∈ {1, . . . , Q}) and we have the collision
D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k = D0 · s(i
?) +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i
?)
k . (3)
Type III attacks imply a collision for the chameleon hash function of Kawachi et
al. [54]: if (3) holds, a short vector of Λ⊥q ([D0 | D1 | . . . | DN ]) is obtained as(
s?T − s(i?)T | m?1T −m(i
?)
1
T | . . . | m?NT −m(i
?)
N
T )T
,
so that a collision breaks the SIS assumption.
The security against Type I attacks is proved by Lemma 6 which applies the
same technique as in [19,66]. In particular, the prefix guessing technique of [53]
allows keeping the modulus smaller than the number Q of adversarial queries
as in [66]. In order to deal with Type II attacks, we can leverage the technique
of [16]. In Lemma 7, we prove that Type II attack would also contradict SIS. uunionsq
Lemma 6. The scheme is secure against Type I attacks if the SISm,q,β′ assump-
tion holds for β′ = m3/2σ(σ1 +N/
√
2) +m1/2(σ + σ1) + (`+ 1)σm. (The proof
is given in Appendix B.2.)
Lemma 7. The scheme is secure against Type II attacks if the SISm,q,β′′ as-
sumption holds for β′′ = m3/2
(
2σ2(`+ 2) +Nσ/
√
2
)
+ 2σ1m
1/2. (The proof is
detailed in Appendix B.3.)
3.3 Protocols for Signing a Committed Value and Proving
Possession of a Signature
We first show a two-party protocol whereby a user can interact with the signer
in order to obtain a signature on a committed message.
In order to prove that the scheme still guarantees unforgeability for obliviously
signed messages, we will assume that each message block mk ∈ {0, 1}2m is
obtained by encoding the actual message Mk = Mk[1] . . .Mk[m] ∈ {0, 1}m as
mk = (M¯k[1],Mk[1], . . . , M¯k[m],Mk[m]). Namely, each 0 (resp. each 1) is encoded
as a pair (1, 0) (resp. (0, 1)). The reason for this encoding is that the proof of
Theorem 2 requires that at least one block m?k of the forgery message is 1 while
the same bit is 0 at some specific signing query. We will show that the correctness
of this encoding can be efficiently proved using Stern-like protocols.
To sign committed messages, a first idea is exploit the fact that our signature
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of Section 3.1 blends well with the SIS-based commitment scheme suggested
by Kawachi et al. [54]. In the latter scheme, the commitment key consists of
matrices (D0,D1) ∈ Z2n×2mq × Z2n×2mq , so that message m ∈ {0, 1}2m can
be committed to by sampling a Gaussian vector s ←↩ DZ2m,σ and computing
C = D0 · s + D1 ·m ∈ Z2nq . This scheme extends to commit to multiple messages
(m1, . . . ,mN ) at once by computing C = D0 · s +
∑N
k=1 Dk · mk ∈ Z2nq using
a longer commitment key (D0,D1, . . . ,DN ) ∈ (Z2n×2mq )N+1. It is easy to see
that the resulting commitment remains statistically hiding and computationally
binding under the SIS assumption.
In order to make our construction usable in the definitional framework of
Camenisch et al. [28], we assume common public parameters (i.e., a common
reference string) and encrypt all witnesses of which knowledge is being proved
under a public key included in the common reference string. The resulting
ciphertexts thus serve as statistically binding commitments to the witnesses. To
enable this, the common public parameters comprise public keys G0 ∈ Zn×`q ,
G1 ∈ Zn×2mq for multi-bits variants of the dual Regev cryptosystem [45] and all
parties are withheld access to the underlying private keys. In order to prove that
the content of a perfectly hiding commitment cm is consistent with encrypted
values, the protocols of Ling et al. [63] come in handy.
Global-Setup: Let B =
√
nω(log n) and let χ be a B-bounded distribution
(i.e., it outputs integer samples with norm at most B with overwhelming
probability). Let p > σ · ω(log n) upper-bounds entries of vectors sampled
from the distribution DZ2m,σ. Generate two public keys for the dual Regev
encryption scheme in its multi-bit variant. These keys consists of a public
random matrix B ←↩ U(Zn×mq ) and random matrices G0 = B · E0 ∈ Zn×`q ,
G1 = B · E1 ∈ Zn×2mq , where E0 ∈ Zm×` and E1 ∈ Zm×2m are short
Gaussian matrices with columns sampled from DZm,σ. These matrices will be
used to encrypt integer vectors of dimension ` and 2m, respectively. Finally,
generate public parameters CK := {Dk}Nk=0 consisting of uniformly random
matrices Dk ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq ) for a statistically hiding commitment to vectors
in ({0, 1}2m)N . Return public parameters consisting of
par := { B ∈ Zn×mq , G0 ∈ Zn×`q , G1 ∈ Zn×2mq , CK}.
Protocol: The signer S, who holds a key pair PK := {A, {Aj}`j=0, D, u},
SK := TA, interacts with the user U who has a message (m1, . . . ,mN ), in
the following interactive protocol.
1. U samples s′ ←↩ DZ2m,σ and computes cm = D0 ·s′+
∑N
k=1 Dk ·mk ∈ Z2nq
which is sent to S as a commitment to (m1, . . . ,mN ). In addition, U
encrypts {mk}Nk=1 and s′ under the dual-Regev public key (B,G1) by
computing for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
ck = (ck,1, ck,2)
=
(
BT · sk,0 + ek,1, GT1 · sk,0 + ek,2 +mk · bq/2c
) ∈ Zmq × Z2mq (4)
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for randomly chosen sk,0 ←↩ χn, ek,1 ←↩ χm, ek,2 ←↩ χ2m, and
cs′ = (cs′,1, cs′,2)
=
(
BT · s0 + e0,1, GT1 · s0 + e0,2 + s′ · bq/pc
) ∈ Zmq × Z2mq (5)
where s0 ←↩ χn, e0,1 ←↩ χm, e0,2 ←↩ χ2m. The ciphertexts {ck}Nk=1 and
cs′ are sent to S along with cm.
Then, U generates an interactive zero-knowledge argument to convince S
that cm is a commitment to (m1, . . . ,mN ) with the randomness s
′ such
that {mk}Nk=1 and s′ were honestly encrypted to {ck}Ni=1 and cs′ , as
in (4) and (5). For convenience, this argument system will be described
in Section 5.3, where we demonstrate that, together with other zero-
knowledge protocols used in this work, it can be derived from a Stern-
like [74] protocol constructed in Section 5.1.
2. If the argument of step 1 properly verifies, S samples s′′ ←↩ DZ2m,σ0
and computes a vector um = u + D · bin
(
cm + D0 · s′′
) ∈ Znq . Next, S
randomly picks τ ←↩ {0, 1}` and uses TA to compute a delegated basis
Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m for the matrix Aτ ∈ Zn×2mq of (1). Using Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m,
S samples a short vector v ∈ Z2m in DuM
Λ⊥(Aτ ),σ
. It returns the vector
(τ,v, s′′) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Z2m to U .
3. U computes s = s′ + s′′ over Z and verifies that
Aτ · v = u + D · bin
(
D0 · s +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk
)
mod q.
If so, it outputs (τ,v, s). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Note that, if both parties faithfully run the protocol, the user obtains a valid
signature (τ,v, s) for which the distribution of s isDZ2m,σ1 , where σ1 =
√
σ2 + σ20 .
In order to prove possession of a message-signature pair, the user runs the
following protocol.
Prove: On input of a signature (τ,v = (vT1 | vT2 )T , s) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Z2m on
the message (m1, . . . ,mN ), the user does the following.
1. Using (B,G0) and (B,G1) generate perfectly binding commitments to
τ ∈ {0, 1}`, {mk}Nk=1, v1,v2 ∈ Zm and s ∈ Z2m. Namely, compute
cτ = (cτ,1, cτ,2)
=
(
BT · sτ + eτ,1, GT0 · sτ + eτ,2 + τ · bq/2c
) ∈ Zmq × Z`q,
ck = (ck,1, ck,2)
=
(
BT · sk,0 + ek,1, GT1 · sk,0 + ek,2 +mk · bq/2c
) ∈ Zmq × Z2mq
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
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for where sτ ←↩ χn, eτ,1 ←↩ χm, eτ,2 ←↩ χ`, sk,0 ←↩ χn, ek,1 ←↩ χm,
ek,2 ←↩ χ2m, as well as
cv1 = (cv1,1, cv1,2)
=
(
BT · sv1 + ev1,1, GT1 · sv1 + ev1,2 + v1 · bq/pc
) ∈ Zmq × Zmq
cv2 = (cv2,1, cv2,2)
=
(
BT · sv2 + ev2,1, GT1 · sv2 + ev2,2 + v2 · bq/pc
) ∈ Zmq × Zmq
cs = (cs,1, cs,2)
=
(
BT · s0 + e0,1, GT1 · s0 + e0,2 + s · bq/pc
) ∈ Zmq × Z2mq ,
where sv1 , sv2 ←↩ χn, ev1,1, ev1,2 ←↩ χm, ev2,1, ev2,2 ←↩ χm, s0 ←↩ χn,
e0,1 ←↩ χm, e0,2 ←↩ χ2m.
2. Prove in zero-knowledge that cτ , cs, cv1 , cv2 , {ck}Nk=1 encrypt a valid
message-signature pair. In Section 5.4, we show that this involved zero-
knowledge protocol can be derived from the statistical zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge for a simpler, but more general relation that we
explicitly present in Section 5.1. The proof system can be made statisti-
cally ZK for a malicious verifier using standard techniques (assuming a
common reference string, we can use [39]). In the random oracle model,
it can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [43].
We require that the adversary be unable to prove possession of a signature
of a message (m1, . . . ,mN ) for which it did not legally obtain a credential by
interacting with the issuer. Note that the messages that are blindly signed by the
issuer are uniquely defined since, at each signing query, the adversary is required
to supply perfectly binding commitments {ck}Nk=1 to (m1, . . . ,mN ).
In instantiations using interactive proofs, we do not consider it as a forgery if
the adversary simply replays a proof generated by a honest prover.
The proof of Theorem 2 makes crucial use of the Re´nyi divergence using
arguments in the spirit of Bai et al. [7]. The reduction has to guess upfront
the index i? ∈ {1, . . . , Q} of the specific signing query for which the adversary
will re-use τ (i
?). For this query, the reduction will have to make sure that the
simulation trapdoor of Agrawal et al. [3] (used by the SampleRight algorithm
of Lemma 5) vanishes: otherwise, the adversary’s forgery would not be usable
for solving SIS. This means that, as in the proof of [16], the reduction must
answer exactly one signing query in a different way, without using the trapdoor.
While Bo¨hl et al. solve this problem by exploiting the fact that they only need to
prove security against non-adaptive forgers, we directly use a built-in chameleon
hash function mechanism which is implicitly realized by the matrix D0 and the
vector s. Namely, in the signing query for which the Agrawal et al. trapdoor
[3] cancels, we assign a special value to the vector s ∈ Z2m, which depends on
the adaptively-chosen signed message (Msg
(i?)
1 , . . . ,Msg
(i?)
N ) and some Gaussian
matrices {Rk}Nk=1 hidden behind {Dk}Nk=1.
One issue is that this results in a different distribution for the vector s ∈ Zm.
However, we can still view s as a vector sampled from a Gaussian distribution
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centered away from 02m. Since this specific situation occurs only once during the
simulation, we can apply a result proved in [60] which upper-bounds the Re´nyi
divergence between two Gaussian distributions with identical standard deviations
but different centers. By choosing the standard deviation σ1 of s ∈ Z2m to be
polynomially larger than that of the columns of matrices {Rk}Nk=1, we can keep
the Re´nyi divergence between the two distributions of s (i.e., the one of the
simulation and the one of the real game) sufficiently small to apply the probability
preservation property (which still gives a polynomial reduction since the argument
must only be applied on one signing query). Namely, the latter implies that, if the
Re´nyi divergence R2(s
real||ssim) is polynomial, the probability that the simulated
vector ssim ∈ Z2m passes the verification test will only be polynomially smaller
than in the real game and so will be the adversary’s probability of success.
Another option would have been to keep the statistical distance between sreal
and ssim negligible using the smudging technique of [5]. However, this would
have implied to use an exponentially large modulus q since σ1 should have been
exponentially larger than the standard deviations of the columns of {Rk}Nk=1.
Theorem 2. Under the SIS assumption, the above protocols are secure protocols
for obtaining a signature on a committed message and proving possession of a
valid message-signature pair. (The proof is given in Appendix B.4.)
Theorem 3. The scheme provides anonymity under the LWE assumption. (The
proof is given in Appendix B.5.)
4 A Dynamic Lattice-Based Group Signature
In this section, the signature scheme of Section 3 is used to design a group
signature for dynamic groups using the syntax and the security model of Kiayias
and Yung [57], which is recalled in Appendix A.
In the notations hereunder, for any positive integers n, and q ≥ 2, we define
the “Powers-of-2” matrix Hn×ndlog qe ∈ Zn×ndlog qeq as:
H = [1 | 2 | 4 | . . . | 2dlog qe−1]⊗ In
=

1 2 4 . . . 2dlog qe−1
1 2 4 . . . 2dlog qe−1
. . .
1 2 4 . . . 2dlog qe−1
 .
Also, for each vector v ∈ Znq , we define bin(v) ∈ {0, 1}ndlog qe to be the vector
obtained by replacing each entry of v by its binary expansion. Note that v =
Hn×ndlog qe · bin(v) for any v ∈ Znq .
In our scheme, each user’s group membership certificate is a signature gener-
ated by the group manager on the user’s public key. Since the group manager only
needs to sign known (rather than committed) messages, we can use a simplified
version of the signature, where the underlying chameleon hash function does not
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have to choose the discrete Gaussian vector s with a larger standard deviation
than other vectors.
A key component of the scheme is the two-message joining protocol whereby
the group manager admits new group members by signing their public key. The
first message is sent by the new user Ui who samples a membership secret con-
sisting of a short vector zi ←↩ DZ4m,σ (where m = 2ndlog qe), which is used to
compute a syndrome vi = F · zi ∈ Z4nq for some public matrix F ∈ Z4n×4mq . This
syndrome vi ∈ Z4nq must be signed by Ui using his long term secret key usk[i]
(as in [57,13], we assume that each user has a long-term key upk[i] for a regular
signature scheme, which is registered in some PKI) and will uniquely identify Ui.
In order to generate a membership certificate for vi ∈ Z4nq , the group manager
GM signs its binary expansion bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}4ndlog qe using the signature scheme
of Section 3.
Equipped with his membership certificate (τ,d, s) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Z2m,
the new group member Ui can sign a message using a Stern-type protocol for
demonstrating his knowledge a valid certificate for which he also knows the
secret key associated with the certified public key vi ∈ Z4nq . This boils down to
providing evidence that the membership certificate is a valid signature on some
binary message bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}4ndlog qe for which he also knows a short zi ∈ Z4m
such that vi = H4n×2m · bin(vi) = F · zi ∈ Z4nq .
Interestingly, the process does not require any proof of knowledge of the mem-
bership secret zi during the joining phase, which is round-optimal. Analogously to
the Kiayias-Yung technique [56] and constructions based on structure-preserving
signatures [2], the joining protocol thus remains secure in environments where
many users want to register at the same time in concurrent sessions.
We remark that a similar Stern-like protocol could also be directly used to
prove knowledge of a Boyen signature [19] on a binary expansion of the user’s
syndrome vi ∈ Z4nq while preserving the user’s ability to prove knowledge of a
short zi ∈ Z4m such that F · zi = vi mod q. However, this would require consid-
erably longer private keys containing 4n · log q matrices {Aj}`j=0 of dimension
n × m each (i.e., we would need ` = Θ(n · log q)). In contrast, by using the
signature scheme of Section 3, we only need the group public key Y to contain
` = logNgs matrices in Zn×mq . Since the number of users Ngs is polynomial, we
have logNgs  n, which results in a much more efficient scheme.
4.1 Description of the Scheme
Setup(1λ, 1Ngs): Given a security parameter λ > 0 and the maximal number
of group members Ngs = 2
` ∈ poly(λ), choose parameters n = O(λ);
modulus q = poly(n); dimensions m = 2ndlog qe; Gaussian parameter
σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n); infinity norm bounds β = σω(
√
logm) and B =√
nω(log n). Let χ be a B-bounded distribution. Choose a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}t for some t = ω(log n), which will be modeled as a
random oracle in the security analysis. Then, do the following.
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1. Generate a key pair for the signature scheme of Section 3.1 for signing
single-block messages. Namely Run TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) to get A ∈ Zn×mq
and a short basis TA of Λ
⊥
q (A). This basis allows computing short vectors
in Λ⊥q (A) with a Gaussian parameter σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖·ω(
√
logm). Next, choose
random matrices A0,A1, . . . ,A`,D←↩ U(Zn×mq ), D0,D1 ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq )
and a vector u←↩ U(Znq ).
2. Choose an additional random matrix F←↩ U(Z4n×4mq ) uniformly. Looking
ahead, this matrix will be used to ensure security against framing attacks.
3. Generate a master key pair for the Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan IBE
scheme in its multi-bit variant. This key pair consists of a statistically
uniform matrix B ∈ Zn×mq and a short basis TB ∈ Zm×m of Λ⊥q (B).
This basis will allow us to compute GPV private keys with a Gaussian
parameter σGPV ≥ ‖T˜B‖ ·
√
logm.
4. Choose a one-time signature scheme ΠOTS = (G,S,V) and a hash func-
tion H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×2mq , that will be modeled as random oracles in
the security analysis.
The group public key is defined as
Y := (A, {Aj}`j=0, B, , D, D0, D1, F, u, ΠOTS, H, H0).
The opening authority’s private key is SOA := TB and the private key of the
group manager consists of SGM := TA. The algorithm outputs
(Y,SGM,SOA).
Join(GM,Ui): the group manager GM and the prospective user Ui run the following
interactive protocol: [Juser(λ,Y), JGM(λ, St,Y,SGM)]
1. Ui samples a discrete Gaussian vector zi ← DZ4m,σ and computes vi =
F · zi ∈ Z4nq . He sends the vector vi ∈ Z4nq , whose binary representation
bin(vi) consists of 4ndlog qe = 2m bits, together with an ordinary digital
signature sigi = Signusk[i](vi) to GM.
2. JGM verifies that vi was not previously used by a registered user and that
sigi is a valid signature on vi w.r.t. upk[i]. It aborts if this is not the
case. Otherwise, GM chooses a fresh `-bit identifier idi = idi[1] . . . idi[`] ∈
{0, 1}` and uses SGM = TA to certify Ui as a new group member. To this
end, GM defines the matrix
Aidi =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 idi[j]Aj
]
∈ Zn×2mq . (6)
Then, GM runs T′idi ← ExtBasis(Aidi ,TA) to obtain a short delegated
basis T′idi of Λ
⊥
q (Aidi) ∈ Z2m×2m. Finally, GM samples a short vector
si ←↩ DZ2m,σ and uses the obtained delegated basis T′idi to compute a
short vector di =
[
di,1
di,2
]
∈ Z2m such that
Aididi· =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 idi[j]Aj
]
· di
= u + D · bin(D0 · bin(vi) + D1 · si) mod q. (7)
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The triple (idi,di, si) is sent to Ui. Then, Juser verifies that the received
(idi,di, si) satisfies (7) and that ‖di‖∞ ≤ β, ‖si‖∞ ≤ β. If these condi-
tions are not satisfies, Juser aborts. Otherwise, Juser defines the membership
certificate as certi = (idi,di, si). The membership secret seci is defined
to be seci = zi ∈ Z4m. JGM stores transcripti = (vi, certi, i, upk[i], sigi) in
the database Sttrans of joining transcripts.
Sign(Y, certi, seci,M): To sign M ∈ {0, 1}∗ using certi = (idi,di, si), where
di = [d
T
i,1 | dTi,2]T ∈ Z2m and si ∈ Z2m, as well as the membership secret
seci = zi ∈ Z4m, the group member Ui generates a one-time signature key
pair (VK,SK)← G(n) and conducts the following steps.
1. Compute G0 = H0(VK) ∈ Zn×2mq and use it as an IBE public key to
encrypt bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}2m, where vi = F · zi ∈ Z4nq is the syndrome of
seci = zi ∈ Z4m for the matrix F. Namely, compute cvi ∈ Zmq × Z2mq as
cvi = (c1, c2) =
(
BT · e0 + x1, GT0 · e0 + x2 + bin(vi) · bq/2c
)
(8)
for randomly chosen e0 ←↩ χn, x1 ←↩ χm,x2 ←↩ χ2m. Notice that, as in
the construction of [63], the columns of G0 can be interpreted as public
keys for the multi-bit version of the dual Regev encryption scheme.
2. Run the protocol in Section 5.5 so as to prove the knowledge of identifier
idi = idi[1] . . . idi[`] ∈ {0, 1}`, vectors si ∈ Z2m,di,1,di,2 ∈ Zm, zi ∈ Z4m
with infinity norm bound β; e0 ∈ Zn, x1 ∈ Zm,x2 ∈ Z2m with infinity
norm bound B and bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}2m,wi ∈ {0, 1}m, that satisfy (8) as
well as
A · di,1 + A0 · di,2 +
∑`
j=1
(idi[j] · di,2) ·Aj −D ·wi = u ∈ Znq (9)
and
H2n×m ·wi = D0 · bin(vi) + D1 · si ∈ Z2nq (10)
F · zi = H4n×2m · bin(vi) ∈ Z4nq . (11)
The protocol is repeated t = ω(log n) times in parallel to achieve negligible
soundness error, and then made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic [43] as a triple piK = ({CommK,j}tj=1,ChallK , {RespK,j}tj=1),
where ChallK = H(M,VK, cvi , {CommK,j}tj=1) ∈ {1, 2, 3}t
4. Compute a one-time signature sig = S(SK, (cvi , piK)).
Output the signature that consists of
Σ =
(
VK, cvi , piK , sig
)
. (12)
Verify(Y,M,Σ): Parse Σ as in (12). Then, return 1 if and only if:
(i) V(VK, (cvi , csi , cid, piK), sig) = 1;
(ii) The proof of knowledge piK properly verifies.
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Otherwise, return 0.
Open(Y,SOA,M,Σ): Parse SOA as TB ∈ Zm×m and Σ as in (12).
1. Compute G0 = H0(VK) ∈ Zn×2mq . Then, using TB to compute a small-
norm matrix E0,VK ∈ Zm×2m such that B ·E0,VK = G0 mod q.
2. Using E0,VK, decrypt cvi to obtain a string bin(v) ∈ {0, 1}2m (i.e., by
computing b(c2 −ET0,VK · c1)/(q/2)e).
3. Determine if the bin(v) ∈ {0, 1}2m obtained at step 2 corresponds to a
vector v = H4n×2m · bin(v) mod q that appears in a record transcripti =
(v, certi, i, upk[i], sigi) of the database Sttrans for some i. If so, output
the corresponding i (and, optionally, upk[i]). Otherwise, output ⊥.
We remark that the scheme readily extends to provide a mechanism whereby
the opening authority can efficiently prove that signatures were correctly opened
at each opening operation. The difference between the dynamic group signature
models suggested by Kiayias and Yung [57] and Bellare et al. [13] is that, in the
latter, the opening authority (OA) must be able to convince a judge that the Open
algorithm was run correctly. Here, such a mechanism can be realized using the
techniques of public-key encryption with non-interactive opening [41,40]. Namely,
since bin(vi) is encrypted using an IBE scheme for the identity VK, the OA can
simply reveal the decryption matrix E0,VK, that satisfies B ·E0,VK = G0 mod q
(which corresponds to the verification of a GPV signature) and allows the verifier
to perform step 2 of the opening algorithm himself. The resulting construction is
easily seen to satisfy the notion of opening soundness of Sakai et al. [73].
4.2 Security Analysis
Due to the fact that the number of public matrices {Aj}`j=0 is only logarithmic in
Ngs = 2
` instead of being linear in the security parameter λ, the proof of security
against misidentification attacks (as defined in Appendix A) cannot rely on the
security of our signature scheme in a modular manner. The reason is that, at
each run of the Join protocol, the group manager maintains a state and, instead
of choosing the `-bit identifier id uniformly in {0, 1}`, it chooses an identifier that
has not been used yet. Since ` λ (given that Ngs = 2` is polynomial in λ), we
thus have to prove security from scratch. However, the strategy of the reduction
is exactly the same as in the security proof of the signature scheme.
Theorem 4. The scheme is secure against misidentification attacks under the
SIS assumption. (The proof is available in Appendix C.1.)
Theorem 5. The scheme is secure against framing attacks under the SIS as-
sumption. (The proof is given in Appendix C.2.)
Theorem 6. Suppose that ΠOTS is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. In
the random oracle model, the scheme provides CCA-anonymity under the LWEq,α
assumption. Namely for any PPT adversary A with advantage ε, there exists an
algorithm B solving the LWEq,α problem with advantage at most 2−Ω(n) smaller.
(The proof is given in Appendix C.3.)
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5 Supporting Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems
This section provides a general framework that allows obtaining zero-knowledge
arguments of knowledge for the majority of relations appearing in lattice-based
cryptography. Since lattice-based cryptosystems are built upon the hardness of the
SIS and LWE problems, the relations among objects of the schemes are typically
represented by modular linear equations. Thanks to the linearity property, we
can often unify the given equations into just one equation of the form:
P · x = v mod q, (13)
where (P, v) are public and x is a secret vector (or matrix) that possesses some
constraints to be proven in zero-knowledge, e.g., its smallness (like a SIS solution,
an LWE noise) or a special arrangement of its entries. Starting from this high-level
observation, we look for a tool that handles these constraints well.
Stern’s protocol [74], originally proposed in the context of code-based cryp-
tography, appears to be well-suited for our purpose. Stern’s main idea is simple,
yet elegant: To prove that a binary vector x has the fixed-Hamming-weight
constraint, simply send the verifier a random permutation pi(x) which should
guarantee that the constraint is satisfied while leaking no additional information
about x. Ling et al. [62] developed this idea to handle the smallness constraint,
via a technique called Decomposition-Extension. This technique decomposes a
vector with small infinity norm B ≥ 1 into blog2Bc + 1 vectors with infinity
norm 1, and then, extends these vectors into elements of sets that are closed under
permutations. Several subsequent works [59][63][61] employed Stern’s idea and
Ling et al.’s technique in different contexts, but did not address the applicability
and flexibility of the protocol in an abstract, generalized manner.
In Section 5.1, we abstract Stern’s protocol to capture many relations that
naturally appear in lattice-based cryptography. In particular, we demonstrate
that the argument systems used in Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 can all be derived
from this abstract protocol. Our strategy might be of wide interest, since it yields
a blueprint for proving many other intricate relations in a simple manner.
5.1 Abstracting Stern’s Protocol
Let D,L, q ≥ 2 be positive integers let VALID be a subset of {−1, 0, 1}L. Suppose
that S is a finite set such that one can associate every pi ∈ S with a permutation
Tpi of L elements, satisfying the following condition:
x ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Tpi(x) ∈ VALID. (14)
We aim to construct a sZKAoK for the following abstract relation:
Rabstract =
{
(M, c),x ∈ ZD×Lq × ZDq × VALID : M · x = c mod q.
}
Note that, Stern’s original protocol corresponds to the special case when
VALID = {x ∈ {0, 1}L : wt(x) = k} (where wt(·) denotes the Hamming weight
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and k < L is a given integer), S = SL - hereunder the set of all permutations
of L elements, and Tpi(x) = pi(x).
The equivalence in (14) plays a crucial role in proving in ZK that x ∈ VALID:
To do so P samples pi ←↩ U(S) and let V check that Tpi(x) ∈ VALID, while the
later cannot learn any additional information about x thanks to the randomness
of pi. Furthermore, to prove in ZK that the linear equation holds, P samples a
masking vector r ←↩ U(ZLq ), sends y = x + r mod q, and convinces V instead
that M · y = M · r + c mod q.
The interactive protocol between P(M, c,x) and V(M, c), which employs a
statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme COM
(e.g., the SIS-based one from [54]), is described in Figure 1.
1. Commitment: P samples r←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S) and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for
COM. Then P sends the commitment CMT = (C1, C2, C3) to V, where
C1 = COM(pi,M · r; ρ1), C2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C3 = COM(Tpi(x + r); ρ3).
2. Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch←↩ U({1, 2, 3}) to P.
3. Response: Depending on Ch, P sends the response RSP computed as follows:
– Ch = 1: Let tx = Tpi(x), tr = Tpi(r), and RSP = (tx, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let pi2 = pi, y = x + r, and RSP = (pi2,y, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let pi3 = pi, r3 = r, and RSP = (pi3, r3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, the verifier proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tx ∈ VALID and C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(pi2,M · y − c; ρ1), C3 = COM(Tpi2(y); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(pi3,M · r3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Tpi3(r3); ρ2).
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Fig. 1: A ZKAoK for the relation Rabstract.
The properties of the given protocol is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. The protocol in Figure 1 is a sZKAoK for the relation Rabstract with
perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(L log q).
In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (M, c), outputs an accepted
transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that M · x′ = c mod q.
The proof of Lemma 8 employs standard simulation and extraction techniques
for Stern-type protocols [54][62]. We defer it to Appendix D.
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5.2 Vector Decompositions and Extensions
Our constructions in the next subsections employ the Decomposition-Extension
technique for Stern-type protocols, introduced by Ling et al. [62]. We formalize
their technique as follows.
– Define, for any positive integer B, the number δB := blog2Bc+ 1 and the
sequence B1, . . . , BδB , where Bj =
⌊
B+2j−1
2j
⌋
for all j ∈ [1, δB]. As noted
in [62], this sequence satisfies
∑δB
j=1Bj = B, and any integer in [−B,B] can
be expressed as a linear combination of the Bj ’s with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
– Define the following matrices for any positive integers m,B:
Km,B =

B1 . . . BδB
B1 . . . BδB
. . .
B1 . . . BδB
 ∈ Zm×mδB ,
and K̂m,B =
[
Km,B
∣∣0m×2mδB] ∈ Zm×3mδB .
– For any positive integer i, denote by B3i the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3i
having exactly i coordinates equal to j, for every j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Lemma 9 (Decomposition-Extension). Let m,B be positive integers. Then,
there exists an efficient algorithm DecExtm,B that on input vector v ∈ [−B,B]m,
outputs vector vˆ ∈ B3mδB such that K̂m,B · vˆ = v.
Proof. Let v = (v1, . . . , vm), where vi ∈ [−B,B] for all i ∈ [1,m]. For each i, one
can efficiently find vi,1, . . . , vi,δB ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that
∑δB
j=1Bj · vi,j = vi.
Let v′ = (v1,1, . . . , v1,δB , v2,1, . . . , v2,δB , . . . , vm,1, . . . , vm,δB )
> ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mδB ,
then Km,B · v′ = v. By appending 2mδB suitable coordinates to v′, one can
obtain a vector vˆ ∈ B3mδB such that K̂m,B · vˆ = v. uunionsq
Additionally, for any positive integer i, let B2i be the set of all vectors
in {0, 1}2i having exactly i coordinates equal to 1. We denote by Ext2i(·) the
algorithm that on input vector w ∈ {0, 1}i, outputs vector wˆ ∈ B2i: it simply
appends i suitable coordinates to w.
5.3 Proving the Consistency of Commitments
The argument system used in our protocol for signing a committed value in
Section 3.3 can be summarized as follows.
Common Input: Matrices {Dk ∈ Z2n×2mq }Nk=0; B ∈ Zn×mq ; G1 ∈ Zn×2mq ;
vectors cm ∈ Z2nq ; {ck,1 ∈ Zmq }Nk=1; {ck,2 ∈ Z2mq }Nk=1; cs′,1 ∈ Zmq ; cs′,2 ∈ Z2mq .
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Prover’s Input: {mk ∈ {0, 1}2m}Nk=1; s′ ∈ [−(p− 1), (p− 1)]2m;{sk,0 ∈ [−B,B]n, ek,1 ∈ [−B,B]m; ek,2 ∈ [−B,B]2m}Nk=1;
s0 ∈ [−B,B]n, e0,1 ∈ [−B,B]m; e0,2 ∈ [−B,B]2m.
Prover’s Goal: Convince the verifier in ZK that:
cm = D0 · s′ +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·mk mod q;
cs′,1 = B
T · s0 + e0,1 mod q; cs′,2 = GT1 · s0 + e0,2 + bq/pc · s′ mod q;
∀k ∈ [N ] : ck,1 = BT · sk,0 + ek,1; ck,2 = GT1 · sk,0 + ek,2 + bq/2c ·mk.
(15)
We will show that the above argument system can be obtained from the one in
Section 5.1. We proceed in 2 steps.
Step 1: Transforming the linear equations in (15) into a unified equation of the
form M · x = c mod q, where x has infinity norm 1, and belongs to a “specially-
designed” set VALID.
To do so, we first form the following vectors and matrices:
x1 =
(
sT0 ‖eT0,1‖eT0,2‖sT1,0‖eT1,1‖eT1,2‖ . . . ‖sTN,0‖eTN,1‖eTN,2
)T ∈ [−B,B](n+3m)(N+1);
x2 =
(
mT1 ‖ . . . ‖mTN
)T ∈ {0, 1}2mN ; x3 = s′ ∈ [−(p− 1), (p− 1)]2m
c =
(
cTm‖cTs′,1‖cTs′,2‖cT1,1‖cT1,2‖ . . . ‖cTN,1‖cTN,2
)T ∈ Z2n+3m(N+1)q ;
D = [D1| . . . |DN ] ∈ Z2n×2mNq ;
P1 =
(
B>
G>1
I3m
)
; Q2 =
(
0
b q2cI2m
)
; Qp =
(
0
b qpcI2m
)
M1 =

0
P1
P1
. . .
P1
 ; M2 =

D0
Qp
0

; M3 =

D
0
Q2
. . .
Q2
 .
We then observe that (15) can be rewritten as:
M1 · x1 + M2 · x2 + M3 · x3 = c ∈ ZDq , (16)
where D = 2n+ 3m(N + 1).
Now we employ the Decomposition-Extension technique from Section 5.2 to
convert (16) into the form M · x = c mod q. Specifically, if we let:

DecExt(n+3m)(N+1),B(x1)→ xˆ1 ∈ B3(n+3m)(N+1)δB ;
M′1 = M1 · K̂(n+3m)(N+1),B ∈ ZD×3(n+3m)(N+1)δBq ;
Ext2mN (x2)→ xˆ2 ∈ B2(2mN); M′2 =
[
M2|0D×2mN ] ∈ ZD×4mNq ;
DecExt2m,p−1(x3)→ xˆ3 ∈ B3(2m)δp−1 ; M′3 = M3 · K̂2m,p−1 ∈ ZD×6mδp−1q ,
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L = 3(n + 3m)(N + 1)δB + 4mN + 6mδp−1, and M =
[
M′1|M′2|M′3
] ∈ ZD×Lq ,
and x =
(
xˆ>1 ‖xˆ>2 ‖xˆ>3
)>
, then we will obtain the desired equation:
M · x = c mod q.
Define VALID as the set of all vectors t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L of the form t = (t>1 ‖t>2 ‖t>3 )>,
where t1 ∈ B3(n+3m)(N+1)δB , t2 ∈ B2(2mN), and t3 ∈ B3(2mδp−1). Note that
x ∈ VALID.
Step 2: Specifying the set S and permutations of L elements {Tpi : pi ∈ S} for
which the equivalence (14) holds.
– Define S := S3(n+3m)(N+1)δB × S4mN × S6mδp−1 .
– For pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3) ∈ S, and for w =
(
w>1 ‖w>2 ‖w>3
)> ∈ ZLq , where w1 ∈
Z3(n+3m)(N+1)δBq , w2 ∈ Z4mNq , w3 ∈ Z6mδp−1q , we define:
Tpi =
(
pi1(w1)
>‖pi2(w2)>‖pi3(w3)>
)>
By inspection, it can be seen that the property (14) is satisfied, as desired. As a
result, we can obtain the required argument system by running the protocol in
Section 5.1 with common input (P,v) and prover’s input x.
5.4 Proving the Possession of a Signature on a Committed Value
We now describe how to derive the protocol for proving the possession of a
signature on a committed value, that is used in Section 3.3.
Common Input: Matrices A, {Aj}`j=0,D ∈ Zn×mq ; {Dk ∈ Z2n×2mq }Nk=0; B ∈
Zn×mq ; G1 ∈ Zn×2mq ; G0 ∈ Zn×`q ; vectors cτ,1, {ck,1}Nk=1, cv1,1, cv2,1, cs,1 ∈
Zmq ; cτ,2 ∈ Z`q; {ck,2}Nk=1, cs,2 ∈ Z2mq ; cv1,2, cv2,2 ∈ Zmq ; u ∈ Znq .
Prover’s Input: τ ∈ {0, 1}`; v1,v2 ∈ [−β, β]m; s ∈ [−(p − 1), (p − 1)]2m;
m = (mT1 ‖ . . . ‖mTN )T ∈ ({0, 1}2m)N ; {sk,0}Nk=1, sv1 , sv2 , s0, sτ ∈ [−B,B]n;
{ek,1}Nk=1, ev1,1, ev2,1, e0,1, eτ,1 ∈ [−B,B]m; {ek,2}Nk=1, e0,2 ∈ [−B,B]2m;
ev1,2, ev2,2 ∈ [−B,B]m; eτ,2 ∈ [−B,B]`.
Prover’s Goal: Convince the verifier in ZK that:
A·v1 + A0 ·v2 +
∑`
i=1
Ai ·τ [i]v2 −D·bin(D0 ·s +
N∑
k=1
Di ·mk) = u mod q, (17)
and that
∀k ∈ [N ] : ck,1 = BT · sk,0 + ek,1; ck,2 = GT1 · sk,0 + ek,2 + bq/2c ·mk;
cv1,1 = B
T · sv1 + ev1,1 mod q; cv1,2 = GT1 · sv1 + ev1,2 + b qpc · v1 mod q;
cv2,1 = B
T · sv2 + ev2,1 mod q; cv2,2 = GT1 · sv2 + ev2,2 + b qpc · v2 mod q;
cs,1 = B
T · s0 + e0,1 mod q; cs,2 = GT1 · s0 + e0,2 + bq/pc · s mod q;
cτ,1 = B
T · sτ + eτ,1 mod q; cτ,2 = GT0 · sτ + eτ,2 + bq/2c · τ mod q.
(18)
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We proceed in 2 steps.
Step 1: Transforming the linear equations in (17) and 18 into a unified equation
of the form M · x = c mod q, where x has infinity norm 1, and belongs to a
“specially-designed” set VALID.
Note that, if we let y = bin(D0 ·s +
∑N
k=1 Di ·mk) ∈ {0, 1}m, then (17) can
be equivalently written as:(
A
0
)
·v1 +
(
A0
0
)
·v2 +
∑`
i=1
(
Ai
0
)
·τ [i]v2 +
(
0
D0
)
· s +
( −D
H2n×m
)
· y
+
(
0
D1| . . . |DN
)
·m =
(
u
02n
)
mod q.
Next, we use basic linear algebra to combine this equation and (18) into:
F·v1+F0 ·v2+
∑`
i=1
Fi ·τ [i]v2 + M1 ·τ+M2 ·
(
y
m
)
+ M3 ·s = c mod q, (19)
where matrices F,F0,F1, . . . ,F` ∈ ZD×mq , M1 ∈ ZD×`q , M2 ∈ ZD×(m+2mN)q ,
M3 ∈ ZD×2mq and vector c ∈ ZDq are built from the public input, for D =
`+ 3n+ 8m+ 3mN .
Now we further transform (19) using the Decomposition-Extension technique.
Specifically, we form the following:
DecExtm,β(v1)→ vˆ1 ∈ B3mδβ ; DecExtm,β(v2)→ vˆ2 ∈ B3mδβ ;
F′ =
[
F · K̂m,β |F0 · K̂m,β |F1 · K̂m,β | . . . |F` · K̂m,β |0D×3mδβ`
] ∈ ZD×3mδβ(2`+2)q ;
Ext2`(τ)→ τˆ = (τ [1], . . . , τ [`], . . . , τ [2`])> ∈ B2`; M′1 = [M1|0D×`] ∈ ZD×2`q ;
Ext2(m+2mN)
(
y
m
)
→ t ∈ B2(m+2mN); M′2 = [M2|0D×(m+2mN)] ∈ ZD×2(m+2mN)q ;
DecExt2m,p−1(s)→ sˆ ∈ B3(2mδp−1); M′3 = M3 · K̂2m,B ∈ ZD×6mδp−1q ,
Now, let L = 3mδβ(2`+ 2) + 2`+ 2(m+ 2mN) + 6mδp−1, and construct matrix
M =
[
F′|M′1|M′2|M′3
] ∈ ZD×Lq and vector
x =
(
vˆ>1 ‖vˆ>2 ‖τ [1]vˆ>2 ‖ . . . ‖τ [`]vˆ>2 ‖ . . . ‖τ [2`]vˆ>2 ‖τˆ>‖t>‖sˆ>
)>
,
then we will obtain the equation M · x = c mod q.
Before going to Step 2, we define VALID as the set of all vectors w ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L
having the form:
w =
(
w>1 ‖w>2 ‖g1w>2 ‖ . . . ‖g2`w>2 ‖g>‖w>3 ‖w>4
)>
for some w1,w2 ∈ B3mδβ , g = (g1, . . . , g2`) ∈ B2`, w3 ∈ B2(m+2mN), and
w4 ∈ B3(2mδp−1). It can be checked that the constructed above vector x is an
element of VALID.
Step 2: Specifying the set S and permutations of L elements {Tpi : pi ∈ S} for
which the equivalence (14) holds.
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– Define S = S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S2` × S2(m+2mN) × S6mδp−1 .
– For pi = (φ, ψ, γ, ρ, η) ∈ S and for z = (zˆ‖z˜‖z1‖ . . . ‖z2`‖z¯‖z¨‖z˘) ∈ ZLq , where
wˆ, w˜,w1, . . . ,w2` ∈ Z3mδβq , w¯ ∈ Z2`q , w¨ ∈ Z2(m+2mN)q , w˘ ∈ Z6mδp−1q , we
define:
Tpi(z) =
(
φ(zˆ)>‖ψ(z˜)>‖ψ(zγ(1))>‖ . . . ‖ψ(zγ(2`))>‖γ(z¯)>‖ρ(z¨)>‖η(z˘)>
)>
as the permutation that transforms z as follows:
1. It rearranges the order of the 2` blocks z1, . . . , z2` according to γ.
2. It then permutes block zˆ according to φ, blocks z˜, {zi}2`i=1 according to
ψ, block z¯ according to γ, block z¨ according to ρ, and block z˘ according
to η.
It can be check that the equivalence (14) holds. Therefore, we can obtain a
sZKAoK for the given relation by running the protocol in Section 5.1.
5.5 The Underlying ZKAoK for the Group Signature Scheme
The argument system upon which our group signature scheme is built can be
summarized as follows.
Common Input: Matrices A,A0,A1, . . . ,A`,B ∈ Zn×mq , D0,D1 ∈ Z2n×2mq ,
F ∈ Z4n×4mq , H2n×m ∈ Z2n×mq , H4n×2m ∈ Z4n×2mq , G0 ∈ Zn×2mq ; vectors
u ∈ Znq , c1 ∈ Zmq , c2 ∈ Z2mq .
Prover’s Input: z ∈ [−β, β]4m, y ∈ {0, 1}2m, w ∈ {0, 1}m, d1,d2 ∈ [−β, β]m,
s ∈ [−β, β]2m, id = (id[1], . . . , id[`])T ∈ {0, 1}`, e0 ∈ [−B,B]n, e1 ∈
[−B,B]m, e2 ∈ [−B,B]2m.
Prover’s Goal: Convince the verifier in ZK that
F · z = H4n×2m · y mod q; H2n×m ·w = D0 · y + D1 · s mod q;
A · d1 + A0 · d2 +
∑`
j=1 Aj · (id[j] · d2)−D ·w = u mod q;
c1 = B
T · e0 + e1 mod q; c2 = GT0 · e0 + e2 + bq/2c · y mod q.
Using the same strategy as in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we can derive a sZKAoK for
the above relation from the protocol given in Section 5.1. As the transformations
are very similar to the ones in Section 5.4, we will only sketch main points below.
In the first step, we unify the given equations to an equation of the form:
V ·
d1s
z
+ V0 · d2 + ∑`
j=1
Vj(id[j]d2) + M1 ·
(
w
y
)
+ M2 ·
e0e1
e2
 = c mod q,
where matrices V,V0, . . . ,V`,M1,M2 and vector c are constructed from the
public input. We then perform the Decomposition-Extension technique for the
secret vectors x1 = (d
>
1 ‖s>‖z>)> ∈ [−β, β]7m, d2 ∈ [−β, β]m; x2 ∈ {0, 1}3m;
and x3 = (e
>
0 ‖e>1 ‖e>2 )> ∈ [−B,B]n+3m. This allows us to obtain a unified
equation P · x = c mod q, and to define the sets VALID, S, and permutations
{Tpi : pi ∈ S} so that the equivalence (14) holds, in a similar manner as in
Section 5.4.
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A Model for Group Signatures with Dynamic Groups
In this appendix the definition of group signatures, and the security requirements
are presented, based on the Kiayias and Yung [57] model.
Informally, a group signature is a scheme that allows a group member to
attest that a message was provided by a member of a group without being altered
during the process and preserving the anonymity of the users. This primitive was
30
introduced by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [11] in 2003 and was extended
to dynamic groups by Bellare, Shi and Zhang (BSZ) in 2005 [13].
In the setting of dynamic groups, the syntax of group signatures includes an
interactive protocol which allows users to register as new members of the group
at any time. The syntax and the security model are those defined by Kiayias and
Yung [57]. Like the very similar BSZ model [13], the Kiayias-Yung (KY) model
assumes an interactive join protocol whereby a prospective user becomes a group
member by interacting with the group manager. This protocol provides the user
with a membership certificate, certi, and a membership secret, seci.
We denote by N ∈ Poly(n) the maximal number of group members.
Definition 4 (Dynamic Group Signature). A dynamic group signature
scheme consists of the following algorithms or protocols.
Setup(1n, N): given a security parameter n and a maximal number of group
members N ∈ N, this algorithm is run by a trusted party to generate a group
public key Y, the group manager’s private key SGM and the opening authority’s
private key SOA. Each key is given to the appropriate authority while Y is
made public. The algorithm also initializes a public state St comprising a set
data structure Stusers = ∅ and a string data structure Sttrans = .
In the following, all algorithms have access to the public parameters Y.
Join: is an interactive protocol between the group manager GM and a user Ui
where the latter becomes a group member. The protocol involves two interactive
Turing machines Juser and JGM that both take Y as input. The execution,
denoted as [Juser(n,Y), JGM(n, St,Y,SGM)], ends with user Ui obtaining a
membership secret seci, that no one else knows, and a membership certificate
certi. If the protocol is successful, the group manager updates the public state
St by setting Stusers := Stusers∪{i} as well as Sttrans := Sttrans||〈i, transcripti〉.
Sign(certi, seci,M): given a membership certificate certi, a membership secret
seci and a message M , this probabilistic algorithm outputs a signature σ.
Verify(σ,M): given a signature σ, a message M and a group public key Y, this
deterministic algorithm returns either 0 or 1.
Open(SOA,M, σ): takes as input a message M , a valid signature σ w.r.t. Y ,
the opening authority’s private key SOA and the public state St. It outputs
i ∈ Stusers ∪ {⊥}, which is the identity of a group member or a symbol
indicating an opening failure.
Each membership certificate contains a unique tag that identifies the user.
The correctness requirement basically captures that, if all parties honestly
run the protocols, all algorithms are correct with respect to their specification
described as above.
The Kiayias-Yung model [57] considers three security notions: the security
against misidentification attacks requires that, even if the adversary can introduce
users under its control in the group, it cannot produce a signature that traces
outside the set of dishonest users. The notion of security against framing attacks
implies that honest users can never be accused of having signed messages that
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they did not sign, even if the whole system conspired against them. And finaly
the anonymity property is also formalized by granting the adversary access to a
signature opening oracle as in the models of [13].
Correctness for Dynamic Group Signatures. Following the Kiayias-Yung ter-
minology [57], we say that a public state St is valid if it can be reached from
St = (∅, ε) by a Turing machine having oracle access to JGM. Also, a state St′ is
said to extend another state St if it is within reach from St.
Moreover, as in [57], when we write certi Y seci, it means that there exists
coin tosses $ for JGM and Juser such that, for some valid public state St
′, the
execution of the interactive protocol [Juser(n,Y), JGM(n, St′,Y,SGM)]($) provides
Juser with 〈i, seci, certi〉.
Definition 5 (Correctness). A dynamic group signature scheme is correct if
the following conditions are all satisfied:
(1) In a valid state St, |Stusers| = |Sttrans| always holds and two distinct entries
of Sttrans always contain certificates with distinct tag.
(2) If [Juser(n,Y), JGM(n, St,Y,SGM)] is run by two honest parties following the
protocol and at the end 〈i, certi, seci〉 is obtained by Juser, then it holds that
certi Y seci.
(3) For each 〈i, certi, seci〉 such that certi Y seci, satisfying condition 2, it
always holds that:
Verify
(
Sign(Y, certi, seci,M),M,Y
)
= 1
(4) For any outcome 〈i, certi, seci〉 of the interaction [Juser(., .), JGM(., St, ., .)] for
some valid state St, if σ = Sign(Y, certi, seci,M), then
Open(M,σ,SOA,Y, St′) = i.
We formalize security properties via experiments where the adversary interacts
with a stateful interface I that maintains the following variables:
– stateI : is a data structure representing the state of the interface as the adver-
sary invokes the various oracles available in the attack games. It is initialized
as stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(n,N). It includes the (initially empty)
set Stusers of group members and a dynamically growing database Sttrans
storing the transcripts of previously executed join protocols.
– n = |Stusers| < N denotes the current cardinality of the group.
– Sigs: is a database of signatures created by the signing oracle. Each entry
consists of a triple (i,M, σ) indicating that message M was signed by user i.
– Ua: is the set of users that were introduced by the adversary in the system
in an execution of the join protocol.
– U b: is the set of honest users that the adversary, acting as a dishonest group
manager, introduced in the system. For these users, the adversary obtains
the transcript of the join protocol but not the user’s membership secret.
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When mounting attacks, adversaries will be granted access to the following
oracles:
– Qpub, QkeyGM and QkeyOA: when these oracles are invoked, the interface looks
up stateI and returns the group public key Y , the GM’s private key SGM and
the opening authority’s private key SOA respectively.
– Qa-join: allows the adversary to introduce users under his control in the
group. On behalf of the GM, the interface runs JGM in interaction with the
Juser-executing adversary who plays the role of the prospective user in the
join protocol. If this protocol successfully ends, the interface increments n,
updates St by inserting the new user n in both sets Stusers and U
a. It also
sets Sttrans := Sttrans||〈n, transcriptn〉.
– Qb-join: allows the adversary, acting as a corrupted group manager, to introduce
new honest group members of his/her choice. The interface triggers an
execution of [Juser, JGM] and runs Juser in interaction with the adversary who
runs JGM. If the protocol successfully completes, the interface increments n,
adds user n to Stusers and U
b and sets Sttrans := Sttrans||〈n, transcriptn〉. It
stores the membership certificate certn and the membership secret secn in a
private part of stateI .
– Qsig: given a message M , an index i, the interface checks whether the private
area of stateI contains a certificate certi and a membership secret seci. If no
such elements (certi, seci) exist or if i 6∈ U b, the interface returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it outputs a signature σ on behalf of user i and also sets Sigs← Sigs||(i,M, σ).
– Qopen: when this oracle is invoked on input of a valid pair (M,σ), the interface
runs algorithm Open using the current state St. When S is a set of pairs
of the form (M,σ), Q¬Sopen denotes a restricted oracle that only applies the
opening algorithm to pairs (M,σ) which are not in S.
– Qread and Qwrite: are used by the adversary to read and write the content
of stateI . Namely, at each invocation, Qread outputs the whole stateI but
the public/private keys and the private part of stateI where membership
secrets are stored after Qb-join-queries. By using Qwrite, the adversary can
modify stateI at will as long as it does not remove or alter elements of Stusers,
Sttrans or invalidate the public state St: for example, the adversary is allowed
to create dummy users as long as he/she does not re-use already existing
certificate tags.
Using this formalism, we can now properly define the three announced security
properties.
Security Against Misidentification Attacks. In a misidentification attack, the
adversary can corrupt the opening authority using the QkeyOA oracle. Moreover,
he/she can also introduce malicious users in the group via Qa-join-queries. His/her
purpose is to come up with a valid signature σ?. He/she succeeds if the produced
signature σ? does not open to any adversarially-controlled.
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Definition 6. A dynamic group signature scheme is secure against misidentifi-
cation attacks if, for any PPT adversary A involved in the experiment hereunder,
we have the advantage of A to be:
Advmis-idA (n) = Pr
[
Expmis-idA (n) = 1
]
∈ negl (n)
Algorithm 1: Experiment Expmis-idA (n)
1 stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(n,N);
2 (M?, σ?)← A(Qpub, Qa-join, Qread, QkeyOA);
3 if Verify(σ?,M?,Y) = 0 then
4 return 0;
5 i = Open(M?, σ?,SOA,Y, St′);
6 if i 6∈ Ua then
7 return 1;
8 return 0;
Non-Frameability. Framing attacks consider the situation where the entire system,
including the group manager and the opening authority, is colluding against some
honest user. The adversary can corrupt the group manager as well as the opening
authority (via oracles QkeyGM and QkeyOA, respectively). He/she is also allowed to
introduce honest group members (via Qb-join-queries), observe the system while
these users sign messages and create dummy users using Qwrite. The adversary
eventually aims at framing an honest group member.
Definition 7. A dynamic group signature scheme is secure against framing
attacks if, for any PPT adversary A involved in the experiment below, it holds
that:
AdvfraA (n) = Pr
[
ExpfraA (n) = 1
]
∈ negl (n)
Full Anonymity. The notion of anonymity is formalized by means of a game
involving a two-stage adversary. The first stage is called play stage and allows the
adversary A to modify stateI via Qwrite-queries and open arbitrary signatures by
probing Qopen. When the play stage ends, A chooses a message M? as well as two
pairs (sec?0, cert
?
0) and (sec
?
1, cert
?
1), consisting of a valid membership certificate and
a corresponding membership secret. Then, the challenger flips a coin d← {0, 1}
and computes a challenge signature σ? using (sec?d, cert
?
d). The adversary is given
σ? with the task of eventually guessing the bit d ∈ {0, 1}. Before doing so, he/she
is allowed further oracle queries throughout the second stage, called guess stage,
but is restricted not to query Qopen for (M
?, σ?).
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Algorithm 2: Experiment ExpfraA (n)
1 stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(n,N);
2 (M?, σ?) ← A(Qpub, QkeyGM, QkeyOA, Qb-join, Qsig, Qread, Qwrite);
3 if Verify(σ?,M?,Y) = 0 then
4 return 0;
5 if i = Open(M?, σ?,SOA,Y, St′) 6∈ Ub then
6 return 0;
7 if
(∧
j∈Ub s.t. j=i (j,M
?, ∗) 6∈ Sigs) then
8 return 1;
9 return 0;
Definition 8. A dynamic group signature scheme is fully anonymous if, for any
PPT adversary A,
AdvanonA (n) := |Pr [ ExpanonA (n) = 1]− 1/2| ∈ negl (n)
Algorithm 3: Experiment ExpanonA (n)
1 stateI = (St,Y,SGM,SOA)← Setup(n);
2
(
aux,M?, (sec?0, cert
?
0), (sec
?
1, cert
?
1)
) ← A(play; Qpub, QkeyGM, Qopen, Qread, Qwrite);
3 if ¬(cert?b Y sec?b) for b ∈ {0, 1} then
4 return 0;
5 if cert?0 = cert
?
1 then
6 return 0;
7 Picks random d← {0, 1}; σ? ← Sign(Y, cert?d, sec?d,M?);
8 d′ ← A(guess; σ?, aux,Qpub, QkeyGM, Q¬{(M
?,σ?)}
open , Qread, Qwrite);
9 if d′ = d then
10 return 1;
11 return 0;
One can wonder why the revocation is not in the dynamic group signature
scheme description, the reason is only pragmatic. It is a different problem to
build a scheme that allows to revoke a group member than a scheme that allows
inserting a group member [42], and it has to be done in a case-by-case fashion.
B Deferred Proofs for the Signature with Efficient
Protocols
In the security proof of the signature with efficient protocols, we make use of the
Re´nyi divergence in a similar way to [7] in the proof of Theorem 2.
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B.1 The Re´nyi Divergence
Instead of the classical statistical distance we sometime use the Re´nyi divergence,
which is a measurement of the distance between two distributions. Its use in
security proofs for lattice-based systems was first considered by Bai et al. [7].
Definition 9 (Re´nyi divergence). For any two discrete distributions P and Q
such that Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q), and a ∈]1,+∞[, we define the Re´nyi divergence
of order a by:
Ra(P ||Q) =
 ∑
x∈Supp(P )
P (x)a
Q(x)a−1
 1a−1
We define the Re´nyi divergences of orders 1 and +∞ by:
R1(P ||Q) = exp
 ∑
x∈Supp(P )
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
 and R∞(P ||Q) = max
x∈Supp(P )
P (x)
Q(x)
.
The divergence R1 is the (exponential) of the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
We will focus on the following properties of the Re´nyi divergence, the proofs
can be found in [60].
Lemma 10 ([7, Le. 2.7]). Let a ∈ [1,+∞]. Let P and Q denote distributions
with Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q). Then the following properties hold:
Log. Positivity: Ra(P ||Q) ≥ Ra(P ||P ) = 1
Data Processing Inequality: Ra(P
f ||Qf ) ≤ Ra(P ||Q) for any function f ,
where P f denotes the distribution of f(y) induced by sampling y ←↩ P (resp.
y ←↩ Q)
Multiplicativity: Assume P and Q are two distributions of a pair of random
variables (Y1, Y2). For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pi (resp. Qi) denote the marginal
distribution of Yi under P (resp. Q), and let P2|1(·|y1) (resp. Q2|1(·|y1))
denote the conditional distribution of Y2 given that Y1 = y1. Then we have:
• Ra(P ||Q) = Pa(P1||Q1) ·Ra(P2||Q2) if YB and Y2 are independent;
• Ra(P ||Q) ≤ R∞(P1||Q1) ·maxy1∈XRa
(
P2|1(·|y1)||Q2|1(·|y1)
)
.
Probability Preservation: Let A ⊆ Supp(Q) be an arbitrary event. If a ∈
]1,+∞[, then Q(A) ≥ P (A) aa−1 /Ra(P ||Q). Further we have:
Q(A) ≥ P (A)/R∞(P ||Q)
Weak Triangle Inequality: Let P1, P2, P3 be three distributions with Supp(P1) ⊆
Supp(P2) ⊆ Supp(P3). Then we have:
Ra(P1||P3) ≤
{
Ra(P1||P2) ·R∞(P2||P3),
R∞(P1||P2) aa−1 ·Ra(P2||P3) if a ∈]1,+∞[.
In our proofs, we mainly use the probability preservation to bound the
probabilities during hybrid games where the two distribution are not statistically
indistinguishable in the attacker point of view.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary that can mount a Type I attack with non-
negligible success probability ε. We construct a PPT algorithm B that uses A
to break the SISm,q,β′ assumption. It takes as input A¯ ∈ Zn×mq and computes
v ∈ Λ⊥q (A¯) with 0 < ‖v‖ ≤ β′.
Algorithm B first chooses the `-bit strings τ (1), . . . , τ (Q) ←↩ U({0, 1}`) to be
used in signing queries. As in [53], it guesses the shortest prefix such that the
string τ? contained in A’s forgery differs from all prefixes of τ (1), . . . , τ (Q). To
this end, B chooses i† ←↩ U({1, . . . , Q}) and t† ←↩ U({1, . . . , `}) so that, with
probability 1/(Q · `), the longest common prefix between τ? and one of the
{τ (i)}Qi=1 is the string τ?[1] . . . τ?[t† − 1] = τ (i
†)[1] . . . τ (i
†)[t† − 1] ∈ {0, 1}t†−1
comprised of the first (t† − 1)-th bits of τ? ∈ {0, 1}`. We define τ † ∈ {0, 1}t† as
the t†-bit string τ † = τ?[1] . . . τ?[t†]. By construction, with probability 1/(Q · `),
we have τ † 6∈ {τ (1)|t† , . . . , τ
(Q)
|t† }, where τ
(i)
|t† denotes the t
†-th prefix of τ (i) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , Q}.
Then, B runs TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) to obtain C ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TC of Λ⊥q (C)
with ‖T˜C‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q). Then, it picks ` + 1 matrices Q0, . . . ,Q` ∈ Zm×m,
where each matrix Qi has its columns sampled independently from DZm,σ. The
reduction B defines the matrices {Aj}`j=0 as
A0 = A¯ ·Q0 + (
∑t†
j=1 τ
?[j]) ·C
Aj = A¯ ·Qj + (−1)τ?[j] ·C, for j ∈ [j, t†]
Aj = A¯ ·Qj , for j ∈ [t† + 1, `]
It also sets A = A¯. We note that we have
Aτ(i) =
[
A¯ A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Aj
]
=
[
A¯ A¯ · (Q0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Qj) + (
∑t†
j=1 τ
?[j] + (−1)τ?[j]τ (i)[j]) ·C
]
=
[
A¯ A¯ · (Q0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Qj) + hτ(i) ·C
]
where hτ(i) ∈ [1, t†] ⊂ [1, `] stands for the Hamming distance between τ (i)|t† and
τ †|t† . Note that, with probability 1/(Q ·`) and since q > `, we have hτ(i) 6= 0 mod q
whenever τ
(i)
|t† 6= τ?|t† .
Next, B picks a random short matrix R ←↩ Zm×m which has its columns
independently sampled from DZm,σ and computes
D = A¯ ·R.
Finally, B samples short vectors eu ∈ DZm,σ1 and computes the vector u ∈ Znq
as u = A¯ · eu ∈ Znq . The public key
PK :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, {Dk}Nk=0, D, u
)
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is given to A.
At the i-th signing query Msg(i) = (m
(i)
1 , . . . ,m
(i)
N ) ∈ ({0, 1}m)N , B can use
the trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m to generate a signature. To do this, B first samples
s(i) ←↩ DZ2m,σ1 and computes a vector uM ∈ Zmq as
uM = u + D · bin
( N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i)k + D0 · s(i)
)
mod q.
Using TC ∈ Zm×m, B can then sample a short vector v(i) ∈ Z2m in DuMΛ⊥(A
τ(i)
),σ
such that (τ (i),v(i), s(i)) satisfies the verification equation (2).
When A halts, it outputs a valid signature sig? = (τ (i†),v?, s?) on a message
Msg? = (m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ) with ‖v?‖ ≤ σ
√
2m and ‖s?‖ ≤ σ1
√
2m. At this point, B
aborts and declares failure if it was unfortunate in its choice of i† ∈ {1, . . . , Q}
and t† ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Otherwise, with probability 1/(Q · `), B correctly guessed
i† ∈ {1, . . . , Q} and t† ∈ {1, . . . , `}, in which case it can solve the given SIS
instance as follows.
If we parse v? ∈ Z2m as (v?1T | v?2T )T with v?1,v?2 ∈ Zm, we have the equality[
A¯ A¯ · (Q0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
?[j]Qj)
]
·
[
v?1
v?2
]
= u + D · bin(D0 · s? + N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k
)
mod q
= A¯ ·
(
eu + R · bin
(
D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k
))
mod q,
which implies that the vector
w = v?1 + (Q0 +
∑`
j=1
τ?[j]Qj) · v?2 − eu −R · bin
(
D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k
) ∈ Zm
is in Λ⊥(A¯). Moreover, with overwhelming probability, this vector is non-zero
since, in A’s view, the distribution of eu ∈ Zm is DΛuq (A¯),σ1 , which ensures that
eu is statistically hidden by the syndrome u = A¯ · eu. Finally, the norm of w is
smaller than β′ = m3/2σ2(`+ 3) +m1/2σ1 which yields a valid solution of the
given SISm,q,β′ instance with overwhelming probability. uunionsq
B.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. We prove the result using a sequence of games. For each i, we denote by
Wi the event that the adversary wins by outputting a Type II forgery in Game i.
Game 0: This is the real game where, at the i-th signing query Msg(i) =
(m
(i)
1 , . . . ,m
(i)
N ), the adversary obtains a signature sig
(i) = (τ (i),v(i), s(i)) for
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each i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} from the signing oracle. At the end of the game, the adver-
sary outputs a forgery sig? = (τ?,v?, s?) on a message Msg? = (m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ). By
hypothesis, the adversary’s advantage is ε = Pr[W0]. We assume w.l.o.g. that the
random `-bit strings τ (1), . . . , τ (Q) are chosen at the very beginning of the game.
Since (Msg?, sig?) is a Type II forgery, there exists an index i? ∈ {1, . . . , Q} such
that τ? = τ (i
?).
Game 1: This game is identical to Game 0 with the difference that the reduction
aborts the experiment in the unlikely event that, in the adversary’s forgery
sig? = (τ?,v?, s?), τ? coincides with more than one of the random `-bit strings
τ (1), . . . , τ (Q) used by the challenger. If we call F1 the latter event, we have
Pr[F1] < Q
2/2` since we are guaranteed to have ¬F1 as long as no two τ (i),
τ (i
′) collide. Given that Game 1 is identical to Game 0 until F1 occurs, we have
|Pr[W1]− Pr[W0]| ≤ Pr[F1] < Q2/2`.
Game 2: This game is like Game 1 with the following difference. At the outset
of the game, the challenger B chooses a random index i† ←↩ U({1, . . . , Q}) as
a guess that A’s forgery will recycle the `-bit string τ (i†) ∈ {0, 1}` of the i†-
th signing query. When A outputs its Type II forgery sig? = (τ?,v?, s?), the
challenger aborts in the event that τ (i
†) 6= τ? (i.e., i† 6= i?). Since the choice of i†
in {1, . . . , Q} is independent of A’s view, we have Pr[W2] = Pr[W1]/Q.
Game 3: In this game, we modify the key generation phase and the way to
answer signing queries. First, the challenger B randomly picks h0, h1, . . . , h` ∈ Zq
subject to the constraints
h0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i
†)[j] · hj = 0 mod q
h0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i)[j] · hj 6= 0 mod q i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} \ {i†}
It runs (C,TC) ← TrapGen(1n, 1m, q), (D0,TD0) ← TrapGen(12n, 12m, q) so
as to obtain statistically random matrices C ∈ Zn×mq , D0 ∈ Z2n×2mq with
trapdoors TC ∈ Zm×m, TD0 ∈ Z2m×2m consisting of short bases of Λ⊥q (C)
and Λ⊥q (D0), respectively. Then, B chooses a uniformly random D←↩ U(Zn×mq )
and re-randomizes it using short matrices S,S0,S1, . . . ,S` ←↩ Zm×m, which are
obtained by sampling their columns from the distribution DZm,σ. Namely, from
D ∈ Zn×mq , B defines
A = D · S
A0 = D · S0 + h0 ·C (20)
Aj = D · Sj + hj ·C ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `}
In addition, B picks random matrices D1, . . . ,DN ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq ) and a random
vector cM ←↩ U(Z2nq ). It samples short vectors v1,v2 ←↩ DZm,σ and computes
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u ∈ Znq as u = Aτ(i†) ·
[
v1
v2
]
−D · bin(cM ) mod q, where
A
τ(i
†) =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] ·Aj
]
=
[
D · S D · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] · Sj)
]
.
The adversary’s signing queries are then answered as follows.
- At the i-th signing query (m
(i)
1 , . . . ,m
(i)
N ), whenever i 6= i†, we have
Aτ(i) =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j] ·Aj
]
=
[
A D · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j] · Sj) + hτ(i) ·C
]
∈ Zn×2mq ,
with hτ(i) = h0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j] · hj 6= 0. This implies that B can use the
trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m to generate a signature. To this end, B first samples a
discrete Gaussian vector s(i) ←↩ DZ2m,σ1 and computes uM ∈ Znq as
uM = u + D · bin(
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i)k + D0 · s(i)) mod q.
Then, using TC ∈ Zm×m, it samples a short vector v(i) ∈ Z2m in DuMΛ⊥(A
τ(i)
),σ
such that (τ (i),v(i), s(i)) satisfies (2).
- At the i†-th signing query (m(i
†)
1 , . . . ,m
(i†)
N ), we have
A
τ(i
†) =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] ·Aj
]
=
[
D · S D · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] · Sj)
]
∈ Zn×2mq (21)
due to the constraint h0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] · hj = 0 mod q. To answer the query,
B uses the trapdoor TD0 ∈ Z2m×2m of Λ⊥q (D0) to sample a short vector
s(i
†) ∈ D
Λ
c′
M
q (D0),σ1
, where c′M = cM −
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m(i
†)
k ∈ Z2nq . The obtained
vector s(i
†) ∈ Z2m thus verifies
D0 · s(i†) = cM −
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i
†)
k mod q, (22)
and A receives sig(i†) = (τ (i†),v(i†), s(i†)), where v(i†) = (vT1 | vT2 )T . By
construction, the returned signature sig(i
†) satisfies
A
τ(i
†) ·
[
v1
v2
]
= u + D · bin(D0 · s(i†) + N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i
†)
k
)
mod q,
and the distribution of (τ (i
†),v(i
†), s(i
†)) is statistically the same as in Game 2.
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We conclude that Pr[W2] is negligibly far apart from Pr[W3] since, by the Leftover
Hash Lemma (see [3, Lemma 13]), the public key PK in Game 3 is statistically
close to its distribution in Game 2.
In Game 3, we claim that the challenger B can use A to solve the SIS problem
by finding a short vector of Λ⊥q (D) with probability Pr[W3]. Indeed, with proba-
bility Pr[W3], the adversary outputs a valid signature sig
? = (τ (i
†),v?, s?) on
a message Msg? = (m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ) with ‖v?‖ ≤ σ
√
2m and ‖s?‖ ≤ σ1
√
2m. If we
parse v? ∈ Z2m as (v?1T | v?2T )T with v?1,v?2 ∈ Zm, we have the equality
A
τ(i
†) ·
[
v?1
v?2
]
= u + D · bin(D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k) mod q. (23)
Due to the way u ∈ Znq was defined at the outset of the game, B also knows
short vectors v(i
†) = (vT1 | vT2 )T ∈ Z2m such that
A
τ(i
†) ·
[
v1
v2
]
= u + D · bin(cM ) mod q. (24)
Relation (22) implies that cM 6= D0 · s? +
∑N
k=1 Dk · m?k mod q by hypothesis.
It follows that bin(cM ) − bin(D0 · s? +
∑N
k=1 Dk · m?k) is a non-zero vector in
{−1, 0, 1}m. Subtracting (24) from (23), we get
A
τ(i
†) ·
[
v?1 − v1
v?2 − v1
]
= D · (bin(cM )− bin(D0 · s? + N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k)
)
mod q,
which implies
[
D · S D · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i†)[j] · Sj)
]
·
[
v?1 − v1
v?2 − v2
]
= D · (bin(cM )− bin(D0 · s? + N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k)
)
mod q. (25)
The above implies that the vector
w = S · (v?1 − v1) + (S0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i
†)[j] · Sj) · (v?2 − v2)
+ bin
(
D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k
)− bin(cM )
is a short integer vector of Λ⊥q (D). Indeed, its norm can be bounded as ‖w‖ ≤
β′′ =
√
2(`+ 2)σ2m3/2 +m1/2. We argue that it is non-zero with overwhelming
probability. We already observed that bin(D0 · s? +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m?k)− bin(cM ) is a
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non-zero vector of {−1, 0, 1}m, which rules out the event that (v?1,v?2) = (v1,v2).
Hence, we can only have w = 0m when the equality
S · (v?1 − v1) + (S0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i
†)[j] · Sj) · (v?2 − v2)
= bin(cM )− bin
(
D0 · s? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k
)
(26)
holds over Z. However, as long as either v?1 6= v1 or v?2 6= v2, the left-hand-side
member of (26) is information theoretically unpredictable since the columns
of matrices S and {Sj}`j=0 are statistically hidden in the view of A. Indeed,
conditionally on the public key, each column of S and {Sj}`j=0 has at least n bits
of min-entropy, as shown by, e.g., [66, Lemma 2.7]. uunionsq
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and we will only
explain the changes.
Assuming that an adversaryA can prove possession of a signature on a message
(m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ) which has not been blindly signed by the issuer, we outline an
algorithm B that solves a SIS instance (A¯, β), where A¯ = [A¯1 | A¯2] ∈ U(Zn×2mq )
with A¯1, A¯2 ∈ U(Zn×mq ).
At the outset of the game, B generates the common parameters par by choosing
B ∈R Zn×mq and defining G0 = B · E0 ∈ Zn×`q , G1 = B · E1 ∈ Zn×2mq . The
short Gaussian matrices E0 ∈ Zm×` and E1 ∈ Zm×2m are retained for later use.
Also, B flips a coin coin ∈ {0, 1, 2} as a guess for the kind of attack that A will
mount. If coin = 0, B expects a Type I forgery, where A’s forgery involves a new
τ? ∈ {0, 1}` that was never used by the signing oracle. If coin = 1, B expects
A to recycle a tag τ? involved in some signing query in its forgery. Namely,
if coin = 1, B expects an attack which is either a Type II forgery or a Type
III forgery. If coin = 2, B rather bets that A will break the soundness of the
interactive argument systems used in the signature issuing protocol or the Prove
protocol. Depending on the value of coin ∈ {0, 1, 2}, B generates the issuer’s
public key PK and simulates A’s view in different ways.
• If coin = 0, B undertakes to find a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (A¯1), which in
turn yields a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (A¯). To this end, it defines A = A¯1 and
generates PK by computing {Aj}`j=0 as re-randomizations of A ∈ Zn×mq as in
the proof of Lemma 6. This implies that B can always answer signing queries
using the trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m of the matrix C without even knowing the
messages hidden in the commitments cm and {ck}Nk=1, cs′ . When the adversary
generates a proof of possession of its own at the end of the game, B uses the
matrices E0 ∈ Zm×` and E1 ∈ Zm×2m as an extraction trapdoor to extract a
plain message-signature pair
(
(m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ), (τ
?,v?, s?)
)
from the ciphertexts
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{c?k}Nk=1 (c?v1 , cv?2 ), c?τ , c?s produced by A as part of its forgery. If the extracted
τ? is not a new tag, then B aborts. Otherwise, it can solve the given SIS instance
exactly as in the proof of Lemma 6.
• If coin = 1, the proof proceeds as in the proof of Lemma 7 with one difference in
Game 3. This difference is that Game 3 is no longer statistically indistinguishable
from Game 2: instead, we rely on an argument based on the Re´nyi divergence.
In Game 3, B generates PK exactly as in the proof of Lemma 7. This implies
that B takes a guess i† ← U({1, . . . , Q}) with the hope that A will choose to
recycle the tag τ (i
†) of the i†-th signing query (i.e., τ? = τ (i
†)). As in the proof
of Lemma 7, B defines D = A¯1 ∈ Zn×mq and A = A¯1 ·S for a small-norm matrix
S ∈ Zm×m with Gaussian entries. It also “programs” the matrices {Aj}`j=0 in
such a way that the trapdoor precisely vanishes at the i†-th signing query: in
other words, the sum
A0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i)[j]Aj = A¯1 · (S0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i)[j] · Sj) + (h0 +
∑`
j=1
τ (i)[j] · hj) ·C
does not depend on the matrix C ∈ Zn×mq (of which a trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m is
known to B) when τ (i) = τ (i†), but it does for all other tags τ (i) 6= τ (i†). In the
setup phase, B also sets up a random matrix D0 ∈ U(Z2n×2mq ) which it obtains
by choosing A′ ←↩ U(Zn×2mq ) to define
D0 =
[
A¯
A′
]
∈ Z2n×2mq . (27)
Then, it computes cM = D0 · s0 ∈ Z2nq for a short Gaussian vector s0 ←↩ DZ2m,σ0 ,
which will be used in the i†-th query. Next, it samples short vectors v1,v2 ←↩
DZm,σ to define
u = A
τ(i
†) ·
[
v1
v2
]
−D · bin(cM ) ∈ Znq .
In addition, B picks extra small-norm matrices R1, . . . ,RN ←↩ Z2m×2m whose
columns are sampled from DZm,σ, which are used to define randomizations of
D0 by computing Dk = D0 ·Rk for each k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The adversary is given
public parameters par := {B,G0,G1, CK}, where CK = {Dk}Nk=0, and the
public key PK :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0,D,u
)
.
Using TC, B can perfectly emulate the signing oracle at all queries, except
the i†-th query where the vector s′′(i
†)
chosen by B is sampled from a distribution
that departs from DZ2m,σ0 . At the i
†-th query, B uses the extraction trapdoor
E1 ∈ Zm×2m to obtain s′(i
†) ∈ Z2m and {mk}Nk=1 – which form a valid opening of
cm unless the soundness of the proof system is broken (note that the latter case
is addressed by the situation coin = 3) – from the ciphertexts c
(i†)
s′ and {ck}Nk=1
sent by A at step 1 of the signing protocol. Then, B computes the vector s′′(i†) as
s′′(i
†)
= s0 −
N∑
k=1
Rk ·m(i
†)
k − s′(i
†) ∈ Z2m, (28)
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which satisfies cM =
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m(i
†)
k + D0 · (s′(i
†)
+ s′′(i
†)
) and allows returning
(τ (i
†),v(i
†), s′′(i
†)
) such that (τ (i
†),v(i
†), s′(i
†)
+ s′′(i
†)
) satisfies the verification
equation of the signature scheme. Moreover, we argue that, with noticeable
probability, the integer vector s(i
†) = s′(i
†)
+ s′′(i
†)
will be accepted by the verifi-
cation algorithm since the Re´nyi divergence between the simulated distribution
of s′′(i
†)
and its distribution in the real game will be sufficiently small. Indeed,
its distribution is now that of a Gaussian vector DZ2m,σ0,z† centered in
z† = −
N∑
k=1
Rk ·m(i
†)
k − s′(i
†) ∈ Z2m,
whose norm is at most ‖z†‖2 ≤ Nσ(2m)3/2 +σ(2m)1/2. By choosing the standard
deviation σ0 to be at least σ0 > Nσ(2m)
3/2 + σ(2m)1/2, the Re´nyi divergence
between the simulated distribution of s′′(i
†)
(in Game 3) and its real distribution
(which is the one of Game 2) can be kept constant: we have
R2(s
′′(i†),2||s′′(i†),3) ≤ exp (2pi · ‖z†‖22
σ20
) ≤ exp(2pi). (29)
This ensures that, with noticeable probability, (τ (i
†),v(i
†), s(i
†)) will pass the verifi-
cation test and leadA to eventually output a valid forgery. So, the success probabil-
ity of A in Game 3 remains noticeable as (29) implies Pr[W3] ≥ Pr[W2]2/ exp(2pi).
When W3 occurs in Game 3, B uses the matrices (E0,E1) to extract a plain
message-signature pair
(
(m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ), (τ
?,v?, s?)
)
from the extractable commit-
ments {c?k}Nk=1 (c?v1 , c?v2), c?τ , c?s generated by A. At this point, two cases can be
distinguished. First, if cM 6=
∑N
k=1 Dk · m?k + D0 · s? mod q, then algorithm B
can find a short vector of Λ⊥q (A¯1) = Λ
⊥
q (D) exactly as in the proof of Lemma
7. In the event that cM =
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m?k + D0 · s?, B can use the fact that the
collision cM =
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m(i
†)
k + D0 · s(i
†) allows computing
w = s? − s(i†) +
N∑
k=1
Rk ·
(
m?k −m(i
†)
k
)
∈ Z2m,
which belongs to Λ⊥q (D0) and has norm ‖w‖2 ≤ Nσ(2m)3/2+4σ1m3/2. Moreover,
it is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Indeed, there exists at least one
k ∈ [1, N ] such that m(i†)k 6= m?k. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that they differ in their
first two bits where m
(i†)
k contains a 0 and m
?
k contains a 1 (recall that each bit
b is encoded as (b¯, b) in both messages). This implies that s′′(i
†)
(as computed
in (28)) does not depend on the first column of Rk but w does. Hence, given
that the columns of Rk have at least n bits of min-entropy conditionally on
Dk = D0 ·Rk, the vector w ∈ Z2m is unpredictible to the adversary.
Due to the definition of D0 ∈ Z2n×2mq in (27), we finally note that w ∈ Z2m
is also a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (A¯).
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• If coin = 2, B faithfully generates par and PK, but it retains the extraction
trapdoor (E0,E1) associated with the dual Regev public keys (G0,G1). Note
that A can break the soundness of the proof system by either: (i) Generating
ciphertexts {ck}Nk=1 and cs′ that do not encrypt an opening of cm in the signature
issuing protocol; (ii) Generating ciphertexts {ck}Nk=1, cτ , cv1 , cv2 and cs that do
not encrypt a valid signature in the Prove protocol. In either case, the reduction
B is able to detect the event by decrypting dual Regev ciphertext using (E0,E1)
and create a breach in the soundness of the argument system.
It it easy to see that, since coin ∈ {0, 1, 2} is chosen independently of A’s
view, it turns out to be correct with probability 1/3. As a consequence, if A’s
advantage is non-negligible, so is B’s. uunionsq
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof is rather straightforward and consists of a sequence of three
games.
Game 0: This is the real game. Namely, the adversary is given common public
parameters par and comes up with a public key PK of its own. The adversary can
run oblivious signing protocols with honest users. At each query, the adversary
chooses a user index i and triggers an execution of the signing protocol with the
challenger emulating the honest users. At some point, the adversary chooses some
user index i? for which the execution of the signing protocol ended successfully.
At this point, the challenger B runs the real Prove protocol on behalf of user i.
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. We define W0 to
be the event that b′ = 1.
Game 1: This game is identical to Game 0 with the difference that, at each
execution of the Prove protocol, the challenger runs the zero-knowledge simulator
of the interactive proof system. The latter simulator uses either a trapdoor hidden
in the common reference string (if Damg˚ard’s technique [39] is used) or proceeds
by programming the random oracle which allows implementing the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. In either case, the statistical zero-knowledge property ensures that
the adversary cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game 0 and |Pr[W1]− Pr[W0]| ∈
negl(λ).
Game 2: This game is like Game 1 except that, at each execution of the Prove
protocol, the ciphertexts {ck}Nk=1, cs, cτ , and cv1 , cv2 encrypt random messages
instead of the actual witnesses. The semantic security of the dual Regev cryp-
tosystem ensures that, under the LWE assumption, the adversary is unable to
see the difference. Hence, we have |Pr[W2]− Pr[W1]| ≤ AdvLWEB (λ).
In Game 2, it is easy that the adversary is interacting with a simulator that emu-
lates the user in the Prove protocol without using the any message-signature pair.
We thus conclude that, under the LWE assumption, A’s view cannot distinguish
a real proof of signature possession from a simulated proof produced without any
witness. uunionsq
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C Security Proofs for the Dynamic Group Signature
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove that any adversary A with non-negligible success probability 
implies an algorithm B solving the SIS problem in the random oracle model.
Let A be such a PPT adversary. we build a PPT algorithm B that uses A
to solve SISm,q,β : Specifically, B takes as input A¯ =
[
A¯1|A¯2
] ∈ Zn×2mq , where
A¯1, A¯2 ∈ Zn×mq , and finds w ∈ Λ⊥q (A¯) with 0 < ‖w‖ ≤ β.
Initialization. Algorithm B first chooses a random bit coin←↩ U({0, 1, 2}) as a
guess for the kind of misidentification attack that A will mount. Also, B chooses
a random `-bit string id† ←↩ U({0, 1}`). In addition, B samples i? ←↩ U([1, Qa]).
Looking ahead, coin = 0 corresponds to the case where, after repeated
executions of A, the knowledge extractor of the proof system reveals witnesses
containing a new identifier id? ∈ {0, 1}` that does not belong to any user in
Ua. In this case, B will be able to exploit A’s forgery when id? = id†. The
case coin = 1 corresponds to B’s expectation that the knowledge extractor
will obtain the identifier id? = id† of a group member in Ua (i.e., a group
member that was legitimately introduced at the i?-th Qa-join-query, for some
i? ∈ {1, . . . , Qa}, where the identifier id† is used byQa-join), but bin(v?) ∈ {0, 1}2m
(which is encrypted in in c?vi as part of the forgery Σ
?) and the extracted
s? ∈ Z2m are such that bin(D0 · bin(v?) + D1 · s?) ∈ {0, 1}m does not match
the string bin
(
D0 · bin(vi?) + D1 · si?
) ∈ {0, 1}2m for which user i? obtained
a membership certificate at the i?-th Qa-join-query. When coin = 1, the choice
of i? corresponds to a guess that the knowledge extractor will reveal an `-bit
identifier that coincides with the identifier id† assigned to the user introduced
at the i?-th Qa-join-query. The last case coin = 2 corresponds to B’s expectation
that decrypting c?vi (which is part of Σ
?) and running the knowledge extractor
on A will uncover vectors bin(v?) ∈ {0, 1}2m, w? ∈ {0, 1}m and s? ∈ Z2m such
that w? = bin(D0 · bin(v?) + D1 · s?) and
bin
(
D0 · bin(v?) + D1 · s?
)
= bin
(
D0 · bin(vi?) + D1 · si?
)
(30)
but (bin(v?), s?) 6= (bin(vi?), si?), where vi? ∈ Z4nq and si? ∈ Z2m are the vectors
involved in the i?-th Qa-join-query.
Depending on coin ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the group public key Y is generated using
different methods.
• If coin = 0, algorithm B first randomly chooses id† ←↩ U({0, 1}`) as a guess for
the `-bit string that will be revealed by the knowledge extractor of the proof system
after repeated executions of the adversary A. Then, it runs TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) to
obtain C ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TC of Λ⊥q (C) with ‖T˜C‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q). Then, it
chooses `+ 2 matrices Q0, . . . ,Q`,QD ∈ Zm×m, each matrix having its columns
sampled independently from DZm,σ. Then, B defines the matrices {Ai}`i=0 as
A0 = A¯1 ·Q0 + (
∑`
i=1 id
†[i]) ·C
Aj = A¯1 ·Qi + (−1)id†[j] ·C, for j ∈ [1, `].
D = A¯1 ·QD
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It also defines A = A¯1. Next, it samples a vector eu ←↩ DmZ,σ and computes a syn-
drome u = A¯1 ·eu ∈ Znq . It picks D0,D1 ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq ) at random and also faith-
fully generates the GPV master key pair (B,TB) as in Step 3 of the real setup algo-
rithm. The group public key Y = (A, {Aj}`j=0,B,D,D0,D1,F,u,OT S, H,H0)
is finally given to A.
Note that, for each id 6= id†, we have
Aid =
[
A¯1 A0 +
∑`
i=1 id[i]Ai
]
=
[
A¯1 A¯1 · (Q0 +
∑`
i=1 id[i]Qi) + (
∑`
i=1 id
†[i] + (−1)id†[i]id[i]) ·C
]
=
[
A¯1 A¯1 + hid ·C
]
(31)
where hid ∈ [1, `] denotes the Hamming distance between the identifiers id and
id†. Since q > `, we have hidj 6= 0 mod q whenever idj 6= id†, so that algorithm B
is able to compute (see [3, Se. 4.2], using the basis TC of Λ
⊥
q (C) and the refined
GPVSample of Lemma 2) a basis Tid of Λ
⊥
q (Aid) with ‖T˜id‖ ≤ Ω(m
√
`n log q).
In contrast, algorithm B lacks a trapdoor for Aid† as the latter only depends on A
and {Qk}`k=0. Observe that, since the columns of the matrices {Qk}`k=0 are sam-
pled from DZm,σ, the matrices A0, . . . ,A` are within statistical distance 2−Ω(m)
of U(Zn×mq ).
• If coin = 1, algorithm B sets up Y by defining D = A¯. Initially, B chooses
Qa − 1 distinct strings id1, . . . , idi?−1, idi?+1, . . . , idQa ∈ {0, 1}` such that, for
each i ∈ [1, Qa]\{i?}, idi will be embedded in the membership certificate returned
in the i-th Qa-join-query. Let also id† = idi? be the `-bit identifier that will be
used in the i?-th query. The reduction B picks random h0, h1, . . . , h` ∈ Zq under
the constraints
hid† = h0 +
∑`
j=1
id†[j] · hj = 0 mod q
hidi = h0 +
∑`
j=1
idi[j] · hj 6= 0 mod q i ∈ {1, . . . , Qa} \ {i†}
Next, B runs (C,TC)← TrapGen(1n, 1m, q), (D1,TD1)← TrapGen(12n, 12m, q)
so as to obtain statistically random matrices C ∈ Zn×mq , D1 ∈ Z2n×2mq together
with trapdoors TC ∈ Zm×m, TD1 ∈ Z2m×2m consisting of short bases of Λ⊥q (C)
and Λ⊥q (D1), respectively. Then, B picks a random D0 ←↩ U(Z2n×2mq ) and re-
randomizes D = A¯1 ∈ Zn×mq using Gaussian matrices S,S0,S1, . . . ,S` ←↩ Zm×m
whose columns are sampled from the distribution DZm,σ. Namely, from D = A¯1,
B defines
A = A¯1 · S
A0 = A¯1 · S0 + h0 ·C (32)
Aj = A¯1 · Sj + hj ·C ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
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As part of the generation of Y, the vector u ∈ Znq is obtained by picking short
discrete Gaussian vectors di?,1,di?,2 ←↩ DZm,σ and computing
u = [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1
id†[j]Aj ] ·
[
di?,1
di?,2
]
−D · bin(cM ), (33)
where cM ←↩ U(Z2nq ) is a randomly chosen vector. Observe that, since A is
statistically uniform over Zn×mq and di?,1 ←↩ DZm,σ, the distribution of u is
statistically close to U(Znq ).
• If coin = 2, B picks A¯′ ←↩ U(Zn×2mq ) and a random matrix Q ←↩ Z2m×2m
whose columns are sampled from DZ2m,σ. These are used to define
D0 =
[
A¯
A¯′
]
∈ Z2n×2mq ,
and D1 = D0 · Q mod q, which is statistically close to U(Z2n×2mq ). All other
components of Y are obtained by faithfully running the setup algoritm.
For each value of coin ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the group public key
Y = (A, {Aj}`j=0,B,D,D0,D1,F,u,OT S, H,H0)
has a distribution which is statistically close to that of the real scheme and Y is
given to A.
Queries. The reduction B starts interacting with the adversary A and the
way it handles A’s queries to the Qa-join oracle depends on the value of the
bit coin ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
• If coin = 0, answers Qa-join-queries as follows. When A triggers an execution
of the joining protocol, it chooses a syndrome vi ∈ Znq . To answer the query, B
chooses a fresh `-bit identifier idi ∈ {0, 1}` such that idi 6= id†. If A also provides a
correct signature sigi such that Verifyupk[i](vi, sigi) = 1, B samples si ←↩ DZ2m,σ
and uses the trapdoor TC to compute a short vector di = [d
T
i,1 | dTi,2]T ∈ Z2m
such that
Aidi ·
[
di,1
di,2
]
= u + D · bin(D0 · bin(vi) + D1 · si), (34)
where Aidi ∈ Zn×2mq is the matrix in (31). Note that B is able to compute such a
vector using the SampleRight algorithm of [3] (since the Hamming distance hidi
between idi and id
? is non-zero). The membership certificate certi = (idi,di, si)
is then returned to A.
• If coin = 1, algorithm B responds each Qa-join-query depending on the index
i ∈ {1, . . . , Qa} of the query. Specifically, we distinguish two cases.
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- If i 6= i?, B proceeds as in the previous case. Namely, it recalls the `-bit
identifier idi ∈ {0, 1}` (for which idi 6= id†) that was chosen in the setup
phase and samples a short vector si ←↩ DZ2m,σ. If A also provides a correct
signature sigi such that Verifyupk[i](vi, sigi) = 1, generates a membership
certificate certi for A as in the case coin = 0. Note that
Aidi =
[
A¯ · S A¯ · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 idi[j]Sj) + hidiC
]
=
[
A¯ · S A¯ + hidi ·C
]
(35)
Since hidi 6= 0, B can use the trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m of Λ⊥q (C) to compute a
short vector di = [d
T
i,1 | dTi,2]T ∈ Z2m such that
Aidi ·
[
di,1
di,2
]
= u + D · bin(D0 · (bin(vi) + D1 · si),
where vi ∈ Z4nq is the syndrome chosen by A at step 1 of the joining protocol.
- If i = i?, B undertakes to generate a membership certificate certi? for the
`-bit identifier id† ∈ {0, 1}` that was chosen at the outset of the game. To this
end, B has to compute certi? without using the trapdoor TC since the matrix
Aid† does no longer depend on C in (35 ). This can be done by recalling
the vector di?,1,di?,2 ∈ Zm and cM ∈ Z2nq that were used to define u ∈ Znq
in (33) and using TD1 . If A provides a correct signature sigi? such that
Verifyupk[i?](vi? , sigi?) = 1, B uses the trapdoor TD1 of Λ⊥q (D1) to sample a
short vector si? ∈ Z2m of DΛci?q (D1),σ, where ci? = cM −D0 · bin(vi?) mod q,
satisfying
D1 · si? = cM −D0 · bin(vi?) mod q,
before returning certi? = (id
†,di? = [dTi?,1 | dTi?,2]T , si?) to A. From the defi-
nition of u ∈ Znq (33), it is easy to see that certi? = (id†,di? , si?) forms a valid
membership certificate for any membership secret zi? ∈ Z4m corresponding
to the syndrome vi? = F · zi? mod q.
Regardless of the value of coin, queries to the random oracle H are handled
by returning a uniformly chosen value in {1, 2, 3}t. For each κ ≤ QH , we let rκ
denote the answer to the κ-th H-query. Of course, if the adversary makes a given
query more than once, then B consistently returns the previously defined value.
Queries to the random oracle H0 are answered in the usual way, by returning a
uniformly random value in the appropriate range.
Forgery. When A halts, it outputs a signature Σ? = (VK?, c?vi , pi?K , sig?) on
some message M?. At this point, B uses the trapdoor TB to decrypt c?vi and
obtain an m-bit string bin(v?) ∈ {0, 1}m.
If we parse the proof of knowledge pi?K as ({Comm?K,j}tj=1,Chall?K , {Resp?K,j}tj=1),
with high probability, A must have invoked the random oracle H on the in-
put (M?,VK?, c?vi , {Comm?K,j}tj=1). Otherwise, the probability that Chall?K =
H(M?,VK?, c?vi , {Comm?K,j}tj=1) is negligible (at most 3−t). It comes that, with
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probability at least ε′ := − 3−t, the tuple (M?,VK?, c?vi , {Comm?K,j}tj=1) coin-
cides with the κ?-th random oracle query for some κ? ≤ QH .
At this stage, the reduction B runs the adversary A up to 32 ·QH/(− 3−t)
times with the same random tape and input as in the initial run. All queries are an-
swered as previously with one difference in the treatment of random oracle queries.
Namely, the first κ? − 1 random oracle queries – which are identical to those of
the first execution since A is run with the same random tape as before – receive
the same answers Chall1, . . . ,Challκ?−1 as in the first run. This implies that the
κ?-th query will involve exactly the same tuple (M?,VK?, c?vi , {Comm?K,j}tj=1) as
in the first run. However, from the κ?-th query onwards, A obtains fresh random
oracle values Chall′κ? , . . . ,Chall
′
QH at each new execution. The Improved Forking
Lemma of Brickell et al. [24] guarantees that, with probability at least 1/2, B
can obtain a 3-fork involving the same tuple (M?,VK?, c?vi , {Comm?K,j}tj=1) with
pairwise distinct answers Chall
(1)
κ? ,Chall
(2)
κ? ,Chall
(3)
κ? ∈ {1, 2, 3}t. With probability
1− (7/9)t it can be shown that there exists an index j ∈ {1, . . . , t} for which the
j-th bits of Chall
(1)
κ? ,Chall
(2)
κ? ,Chall
(3)
κ? are (Chall
(1)
κ?,j ,Chall
(2)
κ?,j ,Chall
(3)
κ?,j) = (1, 2, 3).
From the corresponding responses (Resp?K,j
(1)
,Resp?K,j
(2)
,Resp?K,j
(3)
), B is able
to extract witnesses (d?1,d
?
2) ∈ Zm × Zm, id? ∈ {0, 1}` and w? ∈ {0, 1}m from
the proof of knowledge pi?K such that
Aid? ·
[
d?1
d?2
]
= u + D ·w?
w? = bin
(
D0 · (bin(v?) + D1 · s?
)
,
At this point, B aborts and declares failure in the following situations:
- coin = 0 but id? ∈ {0, 1}` is recycled from some output of the Qa-join oracle.
- coin = 0 and id? 6= id†.
- coin = 1 but id? ∈ {0, 1}` never appeared in a membership certificate
returned by the Qa-join oracle.
- coin = 1 and id? ∈ {0, 1}` belongs to some user in Ua, but this user is not
the one introduced at the i?-th Qa-join-query (i.e., i? 6= i† and id? 6= id†).
- coin = 1 and the knowledge extractor revealed vectors bin(v?) ∈ {0, 1}2m
and s? ∈ Z2m satisfying the collision (30), where bin(vi?) and si? are the
vectors involved in the i?-th Qa-join query.
- coin = 2 and the knowledge extraction yields vectors bin(v?) ∈ {0, 1}2m and
s? ∈ Z2m such that the collision (30) does not occur.
We call fail the event that one of the above situations occurs. Given that the
choices of coin←↩ U({0, 1, 2}) and i? ←↩ U([1, Qa]) are completely independent
of A’s view, the choice of coin is correct with probability 1/3. If coin = 0, B’s
choice of id† ←↩ U({0, 1}`) is correct with probability 1/(Ngs −Qa) ≥ 1/Ngs and,
when coin = 1, B’s correctly guesses i? ∈ [1, Qa] with probability 1/Qa. We find
Pr[¬fail] ≥ 1
3 ·max(Ngs, Qa) =
1
3 ·Ngs .
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Assuming that fail does not occur, B can solve the problem instance as follows.
• If coin = 0, we have id? = id† and B knows a short vector eu ∈ Zm such that
u = A¯1 · eu mod q. Hence, it can obtain a short integer vector
h = d?1 +
(
Q0 +
∑`
i=1
id†[i]Qi
) · d?2 −QD · bin(v?)− eu ∈ Zm
such that A¯1 · h = 0m mod q. Moreover, we have h 6= 0m w.h.p. since the
syndrome u ∈ Znq statistically hides eu ∈ Zm in Λuq (A¯1). Finally, the norm of h
is at most ‖h‖2 ≤ (`+ 1)σ2m3/2 + σm1/2(m+ 2). This implies that (hT | 0m)T
is a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (A¯) and solves the initial SIS instance.
• If coin = 1, the extracted witnesses (d?1,d?2, s?, id?) and the decrypted bin(v?)
satisfy id? = id†,
w? = bin(D0 · bin(v?) + D1 · s?) 6= bin(D0 · bin(vi?) + D1 · si?) = wi?
(since ¬fail implies that the collision (30) did not occur if coin = 1) and
[
A A0 A1 . . . A` −D
] ·

d?1
d?2
id†[1]d?2
...
id†[`]d?2
w?

= u mod q. (36)
Since B already knew short vectors (di?,1,di?,2,wi?) ∈ Zm ×Zm ×Zm such that
[
A A0 A1 . . . A` −D
] ·

d?i?,1
d?i?,2
id†[1]d?i?,2
...
id†[`]d?i?,2
wi?

= u mod q, (37)
by subtracting (37) from (36), we find that
h = S · (d?1 − di?,1) + (S0 +
∑`
j=1
id†[j]Sj) · (d?2 − di?,2) + (w? −wi?) (38)
is a small-norm vector h ∈ Zm satisfying A¯1 ·h = 0 mod q. We claim that h 6= 0
with high probability. Indeed, we know that w? 6= wi? if ¬fail occurs. This implies
that the last term of (38) is non-zero, which rules out that (d?1,d
?
2) = (di?,1,di?,2).
Since the columns of S and {Sj}`j=0 have a lot of entropy conditionally on Y , this
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implies that we can only have h = 0m with negligible probability. Furthermore,
the norm of h can be bounded by ‖h‖2 ≤ 4σ2m3/2(` + 2) + 2m1/2, so that
(hT | 0m)T solves the original SIS instance.
• If coin = 2, B is done as well since the collision (30) directly provides a vector
h = bin(v?)− bin(v?i ) + Q · (s? − s?i ) ∈ Z2m
of Λ⊥q (D0) (which is also in the lattice Λ
⊥
q (A¯) by construction) and has norm
‖h‖2 ≤ 2(σ2(2m)3/2 + (2m)1/2). Moreover, h ∈ Z2m is non-zero with overwhelm-
ing probability given that bin(v?) 6= bin(v?i ) and the large amount of entropy
retained by the columns Q ∈ Z2m×2m given D1 = D0 ·Q. uunionsq
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Let us assume that a PPT adversary A can create a forgery (M?, Σ?)
that opens to some honest user i ∈ U b who did not sign M?. In the random
oracle model, we give a reduction B that uses A to solve an instance of the
SIS4n,4m,q,β problem: B takes as input A¯ ∈ Z4n×4mq and finds a non-zero short
vector w ∈ Λ⊥q (A¯).
Algorithm B generates the group public key Y by faithfully running the
real setup algorithm with the sole difference that, at step 2 of Setup, B defines
F = A¯ ∈ Z4n×4mq . However, the distribution of Y is as in the real scheme. As
a result of having generated Y itself, B knows SGM = TA and SOA = TB. The
adversary B is run on input of the group public key
Y :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, B, D, D0, D1, F = A¯, u, ΠOTS, H, H0)
)
.
If A chooses to corrupt the group manager or the opening authority during the
game, B is able to reveal SGM = TA and SOA = TB. Then, B starts interacting
with A as follows.
- QkeyGM-queries: If A decides to corrupt the group manager, B hands the
secret key SGM = TA to A.
- Qb-join-queries: At any time A can act as a corrupted group manager and
introduce a new honest user i in the group by invoking the Qb-join oracle. At
each Qb-join-query, B faithfully runs Juser on behalf of the honest user in an
execution of Join protocol.
- Qpub-queries: These can be answered as in the real game, by having the
simulator return Y.
- Qsig-queries: When the adversary A requests user i ∈ U b to sign a message
M , B first generates a one-time key pair (VK,SK) ← G(n) to compute
G0 = H0(VK) ∈ Zn×2mq . Next, B recalls the vector zi ∈ Z4m that was chosen
to define the syndrome vi = F ·zi at step 1 of the Join protocol as well as the
identifier idi ∈ {0, 1}` and the short vectors (di,1,di,2, si) that were supplied
by A in an earlier Qb-join-query. It faithfully computes a signature by IBE-
encrypting bin(vi) ∈ {0, 1}2m and using (di,1,di,2, si, zi, si, idi) to compute a
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witness indistinguishable proof piK = ({CommK,j}tj=1,ChallK , {RespK,j}tj=1).
Finally, B computes a one-time signature sig = S(SK, (cvi , piK)) and returns
the signature Σ =
(
VK, cvi , piK , sig
)
to A.
When A halts, it outputs a signature Σ? = (VK?, c?v, pi?K , sig?) for some message
M?, which opens to i? ∈ U b although user i? did not sign the message M? at
any time. Since (M?, Σ?) supposedly frames user i?, the opening of Σ? must
reveal the m-bit string bin(vi?) ∈ {0, 1}m. We note that the reduction B has
recollection of a short vector zi? ∈ Z4m (of norm ‖zi?‖ < 2σ
√
m) such that
vi? = F · zi? mod q which it chose when running Juser on behalf of user i? when
this user was introduced in the group. Hence, B would be able to solve its given
SIS instance if it had another short vector z′ ∈ Z4m satisfying vi? = F · z′ mod q.
To compute such a vector, B proceeds by replaying the adversary A sufficiently
many times and applying the Improved Forking Lemma of Brickell et al. [24].
If we parse pi?K as ({Comm?K,j}tj=1,Chall?K , {Resp?K,j}tj=1), with high prob-
ability, A must have queried H on the input (M?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1).
Otherwise, we would only have Chall?K = H(M
?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1) with
negligible probability 3−t. It comes that, with probability at least ε′ := ε− 3−t,
the tuple (M?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1) was the input of the κ?-th random oracle
query for some index κ? ≤ QH .
At this point, the reduction B runs the adversary A up to 32 ·QH/(ε− 3−t)
times with the same random tape and input as in the first run. All queries
are answered as previously with one difference in the way to handle H-queries.
Namely, the first κ? − 1 H-queries – which are the same as in the first exe-
cution since A is run with the same random tape – obtain the same answers
Chall1, . . . ,Challκ?−1 as in the original run. This implies that the κ?-th query
will also involve exactly the same tuple (M?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1) as in the
original run. From the κ?-th query forward, however, the adversary A obtains
fresh random oracle outputs Chall′κ? , . . . ,Chall
′
QH at each new execution. The
Improved Forking Lemma et al. [24] ensures that, with probability > 1/2, B ob-
tains a 3-fork involving the tuple (M?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1) of the initial run
and with pairwise distinct answers Chall
(1)
κ? ,Chall
(2)
κ? ,Chall
(3)
κ? ∈ {1, 2, 3}t. Since the
forgeries of the 3-fork all correspond to the tuple (M?,VK?, c?v, {Comm?K,j}tj=1),
they open to the same m-bit string bin(vi?) ∈ {0, 1}m and which is uniquely
determined by c?v. In turn, this implies that the three forgeries all reveal the same
bin(vi?) at the second step of Open. With probability 1− (7/9)t it can be shown
that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that the j-th bits of Chall(1)κ? ,Chall(2)κ? ,Chall(3)κ?
are (Chall
(1)
κ?,j ,Chall
(2)
κ?,j ,Chall
(3)
κ?,j) = (1, 2, 3). From the corresponding responses
(Resp?K,j
(1)
,Resp?K,j
(2)
,Resp?K,j
(3)
), B is able to extract a short vector z′ ∈ Z4m
such that vi? = F · z′ mod q.
Due to the statistical witness indistinguishability of the Stern-like proof of
knowledge which is used to generate signature, with overwhelming probability,
we have z′ 6= zi? . Indeed, from the adversary’s view, the distribution of zi? is
DΛvi?q (F),σ, which means that it has at least n bits of min-entropy. Hence, the
difference h = z′ − zi? ∈ Z4m is a suitably short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (A¯). uunionsq
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We will proceed as in [63]: we will prove the anonymity through an hybrid
argument using a sequence of indistinguishable games. The first game Game 0 is
the real experiment and the last one will be such that AdvA(Game 6) = 0
Game 0: This is the real CCA-anonymity game. The challenger runs algorithm
Setup(1λ, 1Ngs) to obtain (Y,SOA,SGM) and then gives Y and SGM to the attacker
A. Using the secret key SOA, the challenger is able to answer all the signa-
tures opening queries. In the challenge phase, A sends a message M? together
with two pairs (sec?0, cert
?
0), (sec
?
1, cert
?
1), where sec
?
d = z
?
id
∈ Zm and cert?d =
(id?id ,d
?
id
, s?id) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Z2m for each d ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger sends
back a challenge signature Σ? = (VK?, c?vi , pi
?
K , sig
?) ← Sign(Y, cert?b , sec?b ,M?)
for a chosen bit b. Then the adversary returns a bit b′. The experiment return 1
if b = b′ or 0 otherwise.
Game 1: In this experiment, we slightly modify Game 0: at the outset of the game,
the challenger generates the one-time signature key pair (VK?,SK?). During the
game, if A requests the opening of a valid signature Σ = (VK, cvi , piK , sig) where
VK = VK?, the challenger returns a random bit and abort. However, this event F1
would contradict the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature ΠOTS. Indeed,
before the challenge phase VK? is independent of A’s view and the probability
that VK? shows up in A’s queries is negligible. Moreover, after seeing the challenge
signature Σ?, if A comes up with a valid signature Σ = (VK, cvi , piK , sig) such
that VK = VK?, then sig is a forged one-time signature, which defeats the strong
unforgeability of ΠOTS. Therefore the probability Pr[F1] that the challenger
aborts in this experiment is negligible. From here on, we thus assume that A’s
opening queries for valid signatures do not include VK?.
Game 2: In this game, we program the random oracle H0 in the following way: at
the beginning of the game, we choose a uniformly random matrix G?0 ∈ Zn×2mq and
set H0(VK
?) = G?0. From the attacker’s point of view, the distribution of G
?
0 is
statistically close to the one in the real attack game, as in [45]. As for other queries,
for each fresh H0-queries on VK, the challenger samples small-norm matrices
E0,VK ←↩ D2mZm,σ and programs the oracle such that H0(VK) = B ·E0,VK mod q.
The chosen matrices E0,VK are retained for later use. Note that the values of
H0(VK) are statistically close to the uniform. For any query involving a previously
queried VK, the challenger consistently returns the previously stored images. The
view of the attacker remains the same as in Game 1, as in the security proof of
the GPV IBE [45].
Game 3: Here, we will change the behaviour of the opening algorithm. Namely,
at each fresh oracle query, we still store the matrices E0,VK ∈ Zm×2mq and, at the
beginning of the game, the challenger samples an uniformly random B? ∈ Zn×mq .
When the adversary queries the opening of a signature Σ = (VK, cvi , piK , sig),
B recalls the small-norm matrices E0,VK which were defined when A first queried
H0(VK). These matrices are used as “decryption matrices” to open Σ for the
corresponding G0 = H0(VK) ∈ Zn×2mq . Similarly to the security proof [45], the
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distribution of G0 is statistically close to the uniform, implying that Game 2 and
Game 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 4: Instead of faithfully generating the NIZKPoK piK , the challenger simu-
lates the proof without using the witness (note that this is possible since the HVZK
property of the underlying proof system is preserved under parallel repetitions).
This is done by running the simulator for the underlying interactive protocol
for each j ∈ 1, . . . , t, and then programming the random oracle H accordingly.
The challenge signature Σ? = (VK?, c?vi , pi
?
K , sig
?) is statistically close to the
challenge signature of the previous game, because the proof system is statistically
zero-knowledge. Consequently, Game 3 and Game 4 are indistinguishable.
Game 5: In this game, we change the generation of the ciphertext c?vi in the
challenge phase. Instead of using the real encryption algorithm of the GPV IBE
to compute c?vi , we return truly random ciphertexts. In other words, we let
c?vi =
(
z1
z2 + bin(v
?
ib
)bq/2c
)
,
where v?ib = F ·z?ib , and where z1 ←↩ U(Zmq ), z2 ←↩ U(Z2mq ) are uniformly random.
The hardness of the decisional LWEq,α problem implies that c
?
vi in Game 4 and
Game 5 are computationally indistinguishable. If A can distinguish between these
two games, it can distinguish(
BT
G?0
T
)
e0 +
(
x1
x2
)
from
(
z1
z2
)
,
which would break the decisional LWEq,α assumption.
Therefore, Game 4 and Game 5 are computationally indistinguishable.
Game G(6): Finally we make a conceptual modification on the previous game.
Namely we sample uniformly random z′1 ←↩ U(Zmq ), z′2 ←↩ U(Z2mq ) and assign
c?vi =
(
z′1
z′2
)
.
Clearly, the distribution of c?vi has not changed since Game 5. Since Game 6 does
no longer depend on the challenger’s bit b ∈ {0, 1}, the result follows. uunionsq
D Proof of Lemma 8
We first restate Lemma 8.
Lemma 11. The protocol in Figure 1 is a sZKAoK for the relation Rabstract with
perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(L log q).
In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (M, c), outputs an accepted
transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
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– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that M · x′ = c mod q.
Proof. Note that, by construction, the protocol is perfectly complete: If an honest
prover follows the protocol, then he always gets accepted by the verifier. It is
also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O˜(L log q).
We now will prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge for the relation Rabstract.
Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting
with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V̂ , such that, given only the public input, SIM
outputs with probability negligibly close to 2/3 a simulated transcript that is
statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This is a prediction of
the challenge value that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Zq, SIM computes a vector x′ ∈
ZLq such that M · x′ = c mod q. Next, it samples r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S),
and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(pi,M · r; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
pi,x′ + r, ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 2: SIM samples x′ ←↩ U(VALID), r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S), and ran-
domness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(pi,M · r; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Tpi(x
′), Tpi(r), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples x′ ←↩ U(VALID), r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S), and ran-
domness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3) as in the previous
two cases, while
C ′1 = COM(pi,M · (x′ + r)− c; ρ1),
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, it responds as follows:
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– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case we have considered above, since COM is statistically
hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the
challenge Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction. Hence,
the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover,
one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an
accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to that of the
prover in the real interaction. In other words, we have constructed a simulator
that can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly
close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose that RSP1 = (tx, tr, ρ2, ρ3), RSP2 =
(pi2,y, ρ1, ρ3), RSP3 = (pi3, r3, ρ1, ρ2) are 3 valid responses to the same commit-
ment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect to all 3 possible values of the challenge.
The validity of these responses implies that:
tx ∈ VALID;
C1 = COM(pi2,M · y − c; ρ1) = COM(pi3,M · r3; ρ1);
C2 = COM(tr; ρ2) = COM(Tpi3(r3); ρ2);
C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ3) = COM(Tpi2(y); ρ3).
Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that:
tx ∈ VALID;pi2 = pi3; tr = Tpi3(r3); tx + tr = Tpi2(y); M · y − c = M · r3 mod q.
Let x′ = y − r3, then we have Tpi2(x′) = tx ∈ VALID which implies that
x′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have M · x′ = M · (y − r3) = c mod q.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
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